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Foreword
Transparency in Government Procurement is one of the four ‘Singapore’ issues,
which were included in the agenda of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations,
which was launched in 2001. At the 5
th Ministerial Session held at Cancun, September
2003, it became clear, however, that many WTO members were yet not reconciled to the
expansion of the scope of WTO to cover any of the Singapore issues.  The future of this
subject as an item on the agenda of the Doha Round is now uncertain.
This study has been undertaken with a view to investigating the implications for
India of a possible agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement in the WTO,
having regard to the procurement laws, policies and practices in the country.  The study
examines  from  the  India’s  perspective  the  specific  elements  of  a  possible  agreement
taking into account the proposals that have been made in the course of more than six
years of deliberations in the relevant Working Group. By way of background it provides
an analysis of the provisions on government procurement in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
In order to help an understanding of the issues the study also provides an outline of the
negotiation,  evolution  and  operation  of  the  plurilateral  agreement  on  government
procurement in the WTO.
The  study  finds  that  there  are  serious  problems  in  respect  of  the  relationship
between trade and an agreement on transparency in government procurement, which does
not have any provisions on market access.  It suggests that India could nevertheless agree
to  participate  in  the  negotiations  in  the  area  if  it  secures  by  way  of  quid  pro  quo
appropriate concessions in the other major areas of negotiations in the Doha Round.
In conclusion, the study makes recommendations for  India’s stand on specific
elements in a possible future agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement.
The study should contribute to a deeper understanding of the issues involved in
the WTO debate on the subject, among policy makers, researchers and members of the
business community in India.






Transparency in Government Procurement
I  Introduction
While  in  their  purchase  operations,  as  in  all  other  activities,  governments
endeavour  to  maximise  the  use  of  scarce  financial  resources,  the  ‘cost  minimizing
objective underlying competitive bidding requirements is frequently offset to a greater or
less  degree  by  other  objectives’  (Hoekman  1997).  Some  of  these  objectives  are  to
promote the development of domestic industry or to assist particular types of enterprises,
such as those in cottage  and small-scale, co-operative  and public sectors.  In order to
enable greater freedom to pursue these objectives government procurement (purchase of
goods for use in government) was excluded from the application of the key provisions of
MFN  and  national  treatment  in  GATT  1947.  As  a  result  government  procurement
remained  excluded  from  the  mainstream  of  liberalisation  in  successive  rounds  of
multilateral trade negotiations during the first three decades of the existence of GATT
1947. It was not until the Tokyo Round (1973-79) that a beginning was made in applying
these fundamental principles to this area. However from the outset the Agreement on
Government  Procurement  has  remained  only  a  plurilateral  agreement,  with  a  limited
membership.  During  the  Uruguay  Round  some  attempts  were  made  to  encourage
developing countries to accede to the Agreement. The EC made a proposal in July 1989
on ‘Guidelines for a Transitional Mechanism’ whereby developing countries could phase
in their obligations under the Agreement, starting only with transparency requirements.
The idea was that, to start with, developing countries would publish tender notices and
post-award information in respect of central government, regional and local entities, and
move on to the accession negotiations only after they had been able to evaluate the costs
and benefits of the Agreement. The proposal was not pursued as it did not elicit much
support  from  Uruguay  Round  participants.  India  also  took  an  initiative  to  facilitate
accession by developing countries by procedural improvements so that these countries
were  not  frustrated  in  their  efforts  to  accede  by  the  burdensome  demands  of  the
developed country Parties. At Marrakesh in 1994 one of the instruments adopted by the
Ministers  was  the  ‘Decision  on  Accession  to  the  Agreement  on  Government
Procurement’, which invited the Committee on Government Procurement to lay down the2
procedure for accession by WTO Members. However, the plurilateral agreement failed to
attract any new developing country Member after the Round, the Ministerial Decision
notwithstanding.
During the First Ministerial Session of the WTO at Singapore in December 1996
the United States proposed that negotiations should be undertaken to develop multilateral
disciplines to bring about greater transparency in government procurement operations of
WTO members. The issue was clubbed with other new areas, viz., trade and investment,
trade and competition policy and trade facilitation proposed for negotiations by the EC
and Japan, and the four are referred to as the Singapore issues.
Ever  since  the  proposals  were  made  in  1996  the  Singapore  issues  have  been
ringed  with  controversy  in  the  WTO.  At  Singapore  there  could  be  no  agreement  on
commencing actual negotiations in any of the four areas, but the Ministers did agree on
studies  being  undertaken  in  all  of  them.  As  on  other  issues,  a  working  group  was
established on transparency in government procurement with the mandate of conducting
“a  study  on  transparency  in  government  procurement  practices,  taking  into  account
national  policies,  and,  based  on  this  study,  to  develop  elements  for  inclusion  in  an
appropriate  agreement”  [WT/MIN  (96)/DEC].  The  language  of  the  Ministerial
Declaration in respect of transparency in government procurement was more advanced
than in other areas as it already envisaged “an appropriate agreement” even though no
negotiations had been agreed. In the case of investment and competition the ministerial
document  specially  mentioned  the  understanding  that  "the  work  undertaken  shall  not
prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in the future”. In subsequent discussions
in the WTO this difference in the mandate in respect of the four Singapore issues did not
prove to be material, and until the Fifth Ministerial Session held at Cancun in 2003, all
four were put in one bundle of issues and either opposed or supported by individual
members as a whole.
Considerable  work  was  done  in  the  Working  Group  between  1996  and  2001.
Members discussed proposals on the definition and scope of government procurement,3
procurement  methods,  transparency,  special  and  differential  treatment  and  dispute
settlement. On transparency detailed proposals were made on publication of information
on  national  legislation  and  procedures,  information  on  procurement  opportunities,
tendering  and  qualification  procedures,  transparency  of  decisions  on  qualification,
transparency of decisions on contract awards, domestic review procedures, maintenance
of record of proceedings and information to be provided to other governments. Some of
the elements proposed for a possible transparency agreement clearly went beyond the
requirements  of  transparency  per  se  and  there  could  be  no  agreement  on  the  full
implications of the term  ‘transparency’.  More  importantly,  members  remained  deeply
divided on the need for negotiations in each of the  four  Singapore issues until the
Ministers met for their Fourth Ministerial Session at Doha to consider the launching of a
comprehensive round of multilateral trade negotiations. Even at that  Session there was
considerable debate and the meeting had to be extended by a day before agreement could
be finally reached. And the decision was somewhat ambivalent. While Ministers agreed
in principle to negotiations in these areas, they postponed the actual commencement of
negotiations until a decision had been taken (by explicit consensus) on the “modalities of
negotiations”.
On  transparency  in  government  procurement  paragraph  26  of  the  ministerial
document provided as follows:
“Recognising the case for a multilateral agreement on transparency in government
procurement and the need for enhanced technical assistance and capacity building in this
area, we agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Ministerial Conference on
the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of
negotiations. These negotiations will build on the progress made in the Working Group
on  Transparency  in  Government  Procurement  by  that  time  and  take  into  account
participants’  development  priorities,  especially  those  of  least-developed  country
participants. Negotiations shall be limited to the transparency aspects and therefore will
not restrict the scope for countries to give preferences to domestic supplies and suppliers.4
We commit ourselves to ensuring adequate technical assistance and support for capacity
building both during the negotiations and after their conclusion” [WT/MIN (01)/DEC//1].
During the discussions that followed in the Working Group members continued to
be  divided on the need and nature of an agreement in this area, as in other Singapore
issues. It became clear that although at Doha there was agreement in principle on the
need  for  a  multilateral  agreement  in  these  areas,  the  reluctant  members  could  block
consensus on modalities and thereby obstruct commencement of negotiations. At Cancun,
India, which was one of the strongest opponents of negotiations on Singapore issues,  was
reported  to    have  been  ready    to    move  forward  on  transparency  in  government
procurement  (and  trade  facilitation).  Some  members,  traditionally  opposed  to  these
issues, such as Malaysia, were willing to go along only in respect of trade facilitation, not
transparency in government procurement. Towards the end of the Ministerial Session, the
EC seemed willing to drop its insistence on negotiations to be undertaken within the
‘single undertaking’ on two of the areas that were subject to the greatest resistance viz.,
investment  and  competition  policy  and  was  asking  for  agreement  only  in  respect  of
transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation. However, the African,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) country members and the least-developed countries (LDCs)
did  not  join  the  consensus.  Consequently  no  decision  could  be  taken  at  the  Fifth
Ministerial Session for commencing negotiations in any of the four Singapore issues.
The Chairman of the Conference, Minister Derbez of Mexico, had proposed a
Revised  Draft  Ministerial  Text  [JOB(03)/150/Rev.2),  which  was  neither  adopted  nor
considered.  This  Draft  had  several  annexes  and  Annex  D  was  on  Transparency  in
Government Procurement. In Annex D the Chairman had tried to reflect the state of play
in the work carried out in the Working Group in very cautious terms, indicating only a
few  broad  areas  of  convergence.  A  group  of  developing  countries  including  India,
Malaysia  and  Egypt  had  circulated  another  draft  of  an  attachment  to  the  Ministerial
Declaration on Singapore issues in WTG/GC/W/514 dated 28 August 2003, which was
reissued as WT/MIN/(03)/W/4, alleging that the Annexes to the draft Revised Ministerial5
Text  relating  to  these  issues  gave  the  views  of  the  proponents  only.  Their  text  on
government procurement listed almost every issue in the area as unsettled.
The assessment immediately after the collapse of the Cancun meeting  was that
the chances of substantive negotiations in the areas of investment and competition policy
commencing in the near future had been pushed back indefinitely, if not dealt a mortal
blow. Negotiations on transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation,
however,  could yet be revived. One of the major players, the EC, remains committed to
negotiations in both these areas, but the US has indicated willingness to drop at least
transparency in government procurement from the agenda of the Round.
This study has been undertaken with a view to investigating the implication for
India of a possible agreement on transparency in government procurement in the WTO,
having regard to the procurement laws, policies and practices in the country. We also
examine from India’s perspective the specific elements of a possible agreement taking
into account the proposals that have been made in the course of more than six years of
deliberations in the Working Group. As India’s situation is little different from that of
many other developing country Members  the study would be of interest to them as well.
By way of background information, we provide an analysis of government procurement
in GATT 1994 and GATS. In order to help in the understanding of the issues involved we
also provide an  outline  of  the  negotiation,  evolution  and  operation  of  the  plurilateral
Agreement on Government Procurement.
Section II of the paper  examines the provisions of the General Agreement on
Tariffs  and  Trade  1994  (GATT  1994)  and  those  of  GATS  that  have  a  bearing  on
government procurement. Section III deals with the origin, evolution and functioning of
the  Agreement  on  Government  Procurement.  Section  IV  describes  the  policies  and
practices on government procurement prevailing in India. Section V presents an analysis
of the various issues that have arisen in the discussions on transparency in the Working
Group. Section VI makes recommendations on the  possible approaches that India could6
adopt  in  any  future  negotiations  on  the  subject.    And  finally  Section  VII  contains  a
summary of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
II  Government Procurement in GATT 1994 and GATS
II.1  GATT 1994
Government procurement is mentioned at two places in GATT 1994, in Article III
(National  Treatment  on  Internal  Taxation  and  Regulation)  and  Article  XVII  (State
Trading Enterprises).
Paragraph 2 of Article III  requires non-discriminatory treatment of imported and
domestically produced products with respect to internal taxes and charges and the manner
of  application  of  such  taxes  and  charges.    With  respect  to  laws,  regulations  and
requirements  affecting  their  internal  sale,  offering  for  sale,  purchase,  transportation,
distribution or use Paragraph 4 of Article III stipulates that imported products must be
accorded  treatment  that  is  no  less  favourable  than  that  accorded  to  like  products  of
national origin. 
1Paragraph 8 (a) of Article III, however, exempts from the application of
the  Article  “all  laws,  regulations  or  requirements  governing  the  procurement  by
government agencies of products purchase for governmental purposes and not with a
view  to  commercial  resale  or  with  a  view  to  use  in  the  production  of  goods  for
commercial resale”. This exemption enables the WTO members to accord preferential
treatment to domestic suppliers in purchases of goods for consumption in government,
consistent with their obligations under GATT 1994.
On state trading enterprises, Article XVII.1 (a) lays down the general obligation
that where a member establishes or maintains such an enterprise, or grants exclusive or
special privileges to any enterprise, such enterprises must “act in a manner consistent
with  the  general  principles  of  non-discriminatory  treatment  prescribed  in  this
                                                          
1  In Korea Beef the Panel (WT/DS161/R) said that like products can be treated differently as long as the
treatment of imported products is not less favourable. The Appellate Body also held in EC Asbestos
(WT/DS135/AB/R)  that  a  government  can  treat  like  products  differently  as  long  as  it  is  not  less
favourable.7
Agreement”. The Korea Beef panel held that the “general principle of non-discrimination
includes at least the provisions of Articles I and III of GATT” (WT/DS161/R). In other
words  the  state  trading  route  cannot  be  used  to  circumvent  the  obligations  on  non-
discrimination.  Again,  however,  it  is  provided  that  the  obligation  does  not  apply  to
“imports of products for immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use and not
otherwise for resale or use in the production of goods for sale”
2. With respect to such
imports a lower level of obligation applies, that each member accord “fair and equitable
treatment” to the trade of other members.
While the legal situation on government procurement is clear in respect of the
general  obligations  of  Articles  III  and  XVII,  it  is  less  so  as  far  as  the  MFN  clause
contained in Article  I of GATT 1994 is concerned. Article  I requires any  advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity granted by a member to any product of any other country
to be accorded “immediately and unconditionally” to the like product of other members.
This article expressly covers duties and charges, the method of levying such duties and
charges and all formalities in connection with importation or exportation. By means of
cross-reference  to  paragraphs  2  and  4  of  Article  III  it  also  covers  internal  taxes  and
charges and laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, purchase,
transportation,  distribution,  or  use.  Thus  the  language  of  Article  I  seems  to  cover
government procurement.
The  negotiating  history  of  GATT  (1947)  shows  that  the  representatives  who
participated  in  the  Preparatory  Works  believed  that  they  had  excluded  government
procurement from the application of the provisions on national as well as most-favoured-
nation treatment (Blank & Marceau 1996). The provision on national treatment explicitly
referred to such exclusion. Their understanding was that government procurement had
been excluded from the purview of the most-favoured-nation clause as well, by virtue of
                                                          
2  An addendum to paragraph 2 of Article XVII, which contains this provision, clarifies that the term
“goods” is limited to products and does not include the purchase and sale of services. The language of
the  addendum  seems  to  imply  that  when  the  products  are  used  for  the  production  of  services  (as
opposed to goods) that are for sale the exemption would still apply. But the negotiating history of the
provision suggests that the objective of representatives at that time was to underscore that the whole
agreement covered only goods and not services.8
the fact that it was subject to the lower level obligation of “fair and equitable” treatment
in the relevant provision on state trading enterprises. This understanding  was legally
flawed, as Article I of GATT 1994 does not explicitly exclude government procurement
from the scope of most-favoured-nation treatment, as Article III does. Article XVII no
doubt imposes a softer obligation in respect of “imports of products for immediate or
ultimate  consumption  in  government  use  and  not  otherwise  for  resale  or  use  in  the
production of goods for sale”. But Article XVII applies only to the operations of state
trading  enterprises,  and  government  purchases  made  otherwise  than  through  such
enterprises  are  not  covered  by  it.  The  legally  correct  way  of  excluding  government
procurement  from  the  scope  of  the  most-favoured-nation  clause  would  have  been  to
incorporate in it a clause such as was added to the provision on national treatment.
In the Tokyo Round the Government Procurement Code was negotiated and in
1981 it entered into force for a small number of GATT contracting parties. In 1995 a new
Government  Procurement  Agreement  was  drawn  up  as  one  of  the  four  plurilateral
agreements  within  the  overall  framework  of  the  WTO  Agreement.  Thus  successive
plurilateral agreements on government procurement have been in existence for more than
two decades among a subset of GATT contracting parties or WTO members. Despite the
lacuna  in  the  language  of  GATT  1994  in  regard  to  the  exclusion  of  government
procurement from the application of the most-favoured-nation clause, there has never
been a challenge from non-signatories on the consistency of these agreements with the
most-favoured-nation  clause.  This  has  been  so  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the
signatories have indeed been applying the agreement on a conditional most-favoured-
nation basis. The  WTO members, like the GATT contracting parties before them, seem
to have treated government procurement for a long period as being not covered by the
most-favoured-nation  clause.  The  shortcoming  in  the  letter  of  the  law  in  this  regard,
noted earlier has been ignored.
Government procurement has been excluded in clear legal terms from the scope
only of the national treatment obligation, but in practice it has not been subject to the
most-favoured-nation clause as well. But what is the extent to which other provisions of9
GATT 1994 apply? We have seen that the obligation of “fair and equitable treatment”
applies to the state trading enterprises in regard to the procurement operations undertaken
by them, except when the goods are resold or used in the production of goods for sale.
Article X (Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations) requires WTO members
to publish promptly laws, regulations, judicial decisions and  administrative rulings of
general  application,  “pertaining  to  the  classification  or  the  valuation  of  products  for
customs  purposes,  or  to  rates  of  duty,  taxes  or  other  charges,  or  to  requirements,
restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefor,
or  affecting  their  sale,  distribution,  transportation,  insurance,  warehousing  inspection,
exhibition, processing, mixing or their use”. Government procurement regulations surely
affect  the  sale  of  products  and  are  clearly  covered  by  the  transparency  obligation  of
Article X.
II.2  GATS
The  General  Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services  (GATS)  was  one  of  the  three
substantive  multilateral  agreements  that  constituted  the  WTO  Agreement.  The
architecture  of  the  agreement  provided  for  certain  obligations  (such  as  Article  II  on
unconditional  most-favoured-nation  treatment  and  Article  III  on  transparency)  to  be
applied  across  the  board  to  the  entire  universe  of  services.  However,  specific
commitments on market access (Article XVI) and national treatment (Article XVII) apply
only to the service sub-sectors that were scheduled i.e. listed by each member in the
national  schedule,  which  formed  an  integral  part  of  the  Agreement.  Specific
commitments have been made separately for the four modes of supply envisaged in the
GATS,  viz.,  cross-  border  supply,  consumption  abroad,  commercial  presence  and
movement of natural persons. They are subject to the qualifications and limitations that
are described in the national schedules, and apply either horizontally to any mode of
supply or specifically to any sub-sector within a mode of supply. The GATS also allowed
time-limited derogation from the most-favoured-nation principle and the extent to which
members have availed of this flexibility has been reflected in the national schedules.10
As in the case of goods, at the time of initial negotiation of the GATT, there was a
general disposition among the countries participating in the Uruguay Round to exclude
government procurement from the commitments of GATS. Paragraph 1 of Article XIII
therefore provided for  exclusion (a virtual “carve out” in terms of the language normally
employed  in  the  Uruguay  Round)  of  government  procurement,  not  only  from  the
applicability of Article II (unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment), but also from
the  coverage  of  specific  commitments  under  Articles  XVI  (market  access)  and  XVII
(national treatment). Government procurement was defined in virtually the same way as
in GATT 1994 viz. ‘the procurement by governmental agencies of services purchased for
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in
the  supply  of  services  for  commercial  sale’.  Exclusion  from  Article  II  rendered  the
conditional  most-favoured-nation  treatment  implicit  in  the  Government  Procurement
Agreement consistent with the GATS. Exclusion from Articles XVI and XVII implied
that government procurement of services remained outside the scope of commitments
made by members for liberalisation of services. It must be underscored, however, that the
intention  of  the  negotiators  at  that  time  seems  to  have  been  that  the  exclusion  of
government procurement from the basic commitments in the GATS would be temporary.
Paragraph  2  of  Article  XIII  provided  that  there  must  be  negotiations  on  government
procurement in services within two years from the date of entry of force of the WTO
Agreement.  The  Working  Party  on  GATS  Rules  has  the  mandate  to  carry  out  the
negotiations according to this mandate, although these have not gone very far. (One of
the  reasons  given  by  some  Members  for  not  moving  forward  in  Article  XIII:2
negotiations  is  the  possible  duplication  with  the  work  of  the  Working  Group  on
Transparency in Government Procurement).
But  does  the  temporary  “carve-out”  affect  the  applicability  to  government
procurement  of  the  transparency  provision  of  GATS.  Article  III  of  GATS  requires
members to “publish promptly and, except in emergency situations, at the latest by the
time of their entry into force, all relevant measures of general application which pertain
to or affect the operation of this Agreement”. It has been argued that this provision could
be interpreted to require governments to publish laws, regulations and all other measures11
of general application, which concern procurement (Low et al. 1997). However, until
such times as government procurement remains  excluded from the application of key
commitments under the GATS, and negotiations are not concluded under paragraph 2 of
Article XIII, it would be equally arguable that the measures pertaining to government
procurement cannot be said to affect the working of the GATS and are therefore not
covered by its Article III.
III  GATT and WTO Agreements on Government Procurement
International  efforts  to  develop  disciplines  to  govern  government  procurement
procedures have been undertaken by the United Nations, the  World  Bank  and in  the
context of negotiations for regional trading arrangements. The UNCITRAL Model Law
on  Procurement  of  Goods,  Construction  and  Services  was  developed  by  the  United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (the UNCITRAL) to provide a model
for the modernisation of their procurement laws and practices. The World Bank has also
developed the Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and the
Guidelines for Selection and Employment of Consultants by the World Band Borrowers,
which is to be used for carrying out projects financed from a loan from the International
Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  (IBRD)  or  a  credit  from  the  International
Development Association (IDA). In the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) the
Government  Procurement  Experts  Group  has  developed  Non-Binding  Principles  on
Government Procurement. Similar efforts are ongoing in the context of the negotiations
on  the  Free  Trade  Area  of  the  Americas  (FTAA).  However,  the  only  international
instrument  that  can  be  characterised  as  an  enforceable  agreement  is  the  Government
Procurement  Agreement  developed  first  under  the  auspices  of  GATT  1947  and
renegotiated within the framework of the WTO. We take up these agreements in greater
detail below.
III.1  Tokyo Round Agreement (GPA 1981)
As we have noted earlier, government procurement activities of the contracting
parties to GATT 1947 remained insulated from liberalisation efforts in the first six rounds12
of multilateral trade negotiations. The Ministerial Declaration that launched the Tokyo
Round envisaged that apart from the reduction or elimination of tariffs the negotiations
would  also  aim  to  “reduce  or  eliminate  non-tariff  measures  or,  where  this  is  not
appropriate, to reduce or eliminate their trade restricting or distorting effects, and to bring
such measures under effective international discipline” (GATT BISD, 20S). Under this
mandate a Sub-Committee on Government Procurement was established in July 1976 to
provide a forum for negotiations in the area. The next important step was the receipt in
GATT in December 1976 of the result of expert level work that had been going on in the
OECD for 15 years. The OECD draft formed the basis of the “Draft Integrated Text for
Negotiations on Government Procurement” circulated in December 1977 by the GATT
Secretariat to assist in the negotiations (Blank and Marceau 1996). The negotiations that
followed  resulted  in  an  agreed  text  by  the  spring  of  1979,  and  the  Agreement  on
Government Procurement was one of the non-tariff measure agreements resulting from
the  Tokyo  Round.  None  of  these  agreements  was  accepted  by  a  large  majority  of
developing  countries  that  were  contracting  parties  to  GATT,  but  the  Agreement  on
Government Procurement had the least number of signatories. Although India, Korea,
Jamaica and Nigeria had participated actively in the negotiations they did not become
Parties eventually. Of the developing countries only Hong Kong and Singapore joined. In
India’s case the list of entities offered was not acceptable to the  principal  developed
countries,  which  wanted  India  to  add  to  the  list  of  entities  the  Director  General  of
Supplies and Disposal (DGS&D), which was the principal procurement agency of the
Central Government in those times. In India the assessment at that time was that joining
the  Agreement  would  not  secure  much  benefit  by  way  of  additional  market  access
opportunities. Government  was,  therefore,  not  willing  to  consider  going  beyond  such
entities as the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) and Doordarshan, which were
included in the original offer.
After its entry into force on January 1, 1981,the Tokyo Round Agreement on
Government Procurement (GPA 1981) went through the process of revision twice, during
1983-86 and again in 1988-96 before it was replaced by the Uruguay Round Agreement
on Government Procurement. As we shall later analyse in detail the provisions of the13
Uruguay  Round  Agreement,  here  we  describe  only  the  salient  features  of  the  Tokyo
Round Agreement.
III.1.1   Scope and Coverage
The GPA1981 did not contain a definition of government procurement but laid
down  three  parameters,  which  defined  its  scope  and  coverage.  First,  its  disciplines
applied  only  to  the  entities  listed  by  each  Party  and  included  in  Annex  I  of  the
Agreement, and only central government agencies were included. The lists of entities had
been drawn up in the course of negotiations in which each Party ensured that the trade
opportunity that was created for its suppliers in the markets of other Parties matched the
opportunity provided by it to suppliers in other Parties. In other words Parties ensured
that they received reciprocity in the negotiations on the list of entities. Second, it covered
purchase of products only and services incidental to the supply of products were included
if the value of such services did not exceed that of the products themselves. Third, there
was a value threshold of SDR 150,000, and the Agreement did not apply to procurement
contracts below the threshold.
III.1.2  Substantive Obligations
The most important substantive commitment in GPA1981 was that the Parties
agreed to extend both national and most-favoured-nation treatment to other Parties in
respect  of  government  procurement  on  an  immediate  and  unconditional  basis.  The
explicit exclusion of government procurement from the national treatment obligation, and
its de facto exclusion from the most-favoured-nation clause, were negotiated away among
the Parties in respect of the entities annexed to the Agreement.
III.1.3  Transparency provisions
The GPA1981 contained a number of provisions aimed at securing transparency
of government procurement operations of Parties. In line with the transparency provision
in Article X of GATT 1947, any law, regulation, judicial decision, administrative ruling14
of general application regarding government procurement was required to be published in
a publication listed by each Party in an Annex to the Agreement. Equally important were
the provisions on ex ante publication of invitations to bid or for qualification of suppliers
and ex post announcement of decisions. These provisions were intended to ensure that
there was no de facto discrimination against any foreign supplier in the procedures for
procurement.  The  transparency  requirements  are  thus  inextricably  linked  with  the
provisions on tendering procedures.
III.1.4  Tendering Procedures
The GPA1981 allowed Parties to use open, selective as well as single tendering
procedures, provided the conditions stipulated for each were complied with. Elaborate
provisions  were  included  in  the  agreement  to  ensure  fair  dealing  and  maximum
transparency while inviting bids by suppliers and in the awarding of contracts. The GPA
1981 discouraged but did not rule out use of conditions relating to offset procurement
opportunities and licensing of technology. Where such conditions were used Parties were
required not to favour suppliers from one Party over suppliers from other Parties.
III.1.5  Other important provisions of the GPA 1981
(i)  The  GPA  1981,  like  other  Tokyo  Round  non-tariff  measure  agreements  also
provided a mechanism for the resolution of disputes on the pattern of the central
dispute settlement machinery of GATT 1947.
(ii)  The Agreement also provided for further negotiations to take place at the end of
three years from its entry into force with a view to broadening and improving it
on the basis of mutual reciprocity. It was envisaged that during such negotiations
the possibility of expanding the coverage to include service contracts would also
be explored.
(iii)  Although few developing countries became parties to the Agreement, it contained
elaborate provisions on special and differential treatment of developing countries.15
First, developed countries, while preparing the list of entities to be covered by the
Agreement, were expected to try to include entities purchasing products of export
interest to developing countries. The developed country Parties were also required
to establish information centres to respond to reasonable requests from developing
country  Parties  for  information  relating  to  government  procurement.  Other
provisions  were  aimed  at  lightening  the  burden  on  developing  countries  in
including the entities to be covered by the Agreement. In the negotiations account
had to be taken of the development, financial and trade needs of the developing
countries,  and  in  particular  their  balance-of-payments  position,  their  need  to
promote  the  establishment  of  domestic  industries  and  their  need  to  support
industrial units substantially dependent on government procurement. Developing
countries  were  also  allowed  to  negotiate  exclusions  from  the  rule  on  national
treatment with respect to certain entities and products that were included in their
list of entities. It would be noted that the provision on exclusions only provided
for  the  possibility  for  the  developing  countries  to  seek  exclusions  during
negotiations or thereafter: there was no assurance that such exclusions would in
fact be permitted. Inherent in the provision was the discretion of the developed
country Parties to refuse the request for exclusions or even the offer of entities if
they  felt  that  the  offer  of  individual  developing  country  concerned  was  not
adequate. Were the seemingly extensive provisions on S&D treatment in GPA
1981 an empty shell?
III.2  Negotiations under the GPA 1981
As mentioned above, the GPA 1981 provided for negotiations for “broadening”
and “improving” the Agreement and “expanding” its coverage.  During the negotiations,
which began in November 1983, these terms assumed specific connotation. “Broadening”
meant enlargement of the country list of entities; “expansion” referred to the inclusion of
service contracts; and “improvement” signified changes in the text (Blank and Marceau
1996). While the Parties attached equal importance to the three aspects, in the first phase
ending in November 1986 agreement could be reached only on improvements in the text,
which  later  took  the  form  of  a  Protocol  of  Amendments  (GPR/M/24  reproduced  in16
BISD/33S). None of the changes were of major significance, specially when assessed in
the context of what was going to be agreed in subsequent negotiations leading up to the
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. Mention needs to be made only of the
changes in coverage and redefinition of the basic obligations. The original GPA 1981
covered only procurement of products together with services essential to the supply of
products. The amendment brought within the purview of the Agreement lease, rental or
hire  purchase  as  well.  The  value  threshold  was  lowered  from  SDR  150,000  to  SDR
130,000. The provision on non-discrimination was elaborated to provide that the entities
did not discriminate against locally established suppliers on the basis of degree of foreign
affiliation or ownership or on the basis of the origin of the good being supplied. The
revised Agreement entered into force on 14 February 1988.
 Simultaneously with the adoption of the agreed improvements Parties to the GPA
1981 decided to continue work on increasing the coverage of the Agreement, inclusion of
service contracts and further improving the text. Negotiations proceeded in parallel with
the Uruguay Round, and although unconnected with it, were affected by the vicissitudes
of  the  Round.  These  negotiations  resulted  in  a  vastly  increased  coverage  of  the
Agreement including entities at sub-Federal level and service contracts. The text of the
Agreement  was  also  thoroughly  revised  and  the  new  Agreement  on  Government
Procurement was approved on April 15, 1994 at Marrakesh as one of the four plurilateral
agreements within the framework of the WTO Agreement. The Agreement entered into
force on January1, 1996, one year after the WTO Agreement. A feature of the Agreement
was  that  a  number  of  Parties  took  recourse  to  sectoral  non-application  against  other
Parties in cases where they felt that they had not received reciprocal benefits in the listing
of entities. Originally the expectation was that these reservations would be temporary,
pending further negotiations after April 15, 1994, when the Agreement was adopted and
January 1, 1996, when it was to enter into force. However, a large number of them have
been continued even after the entry into force of the new Agreement. They are listed in
the General Notes and  Derogations appended to the  Annexes. We deal with these in
greater detail below while examining the provisions of GPA 1996.17
III.3  WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 1996 (GPA 1996)
The  basic  substantive  obligations  of  the  Agreement  remained  the  same  as  in
GPA1981 i.e. immediate and unconditional most favoured nation and national treatment
of products and suppliers of the Parties. The  architecture of the Agreement also was
unchanged  in  as  much  as  the  obligations  applied  to  only  the  entities  listed  in  the
Appendix. Any of the three tendering procedures (open, selective or limited) can be used
provided  the  prescribed  rules  are  followed.  Special  and  differential  treatment  of
developing countries has been retained in the form in which it existed in GPA 1981.
However, the coverage has been expanded to services and the lists of entities enlarged
manifold.  Several  improvements  have  been  made  in  the  text  to  ensure  greater
transparency  and  fair  dealing,  the  most  important  of  them  being  the  requirement  for
introducing domestic procedures for challenging procurement decisions alleged to be in
breach of the Agreement. We consider below some of the key aspects of the Agreement.
III.3.1  Scope and coverage
As noted above the biggest change in the Agreement was inclusion of services
and manifold enlargement of the lists of entities by the Parties. GPA 1981 covered only
central government entities listed in its Annex I. Appendix I of GPA 1996 contains the
lists of central government entities in Annex 1, of sub-federal entities in Annex 2 and of
other entities such as government enterprises and utilities in Annex 3.  In respect of goods
generally all products are covered, unless restrictions have been imposed in respect of a
certain class of goods e.g. implements of war in the case of the Ministry/Department of
Defence. However, in respect of services only those categories are covered that are listed
in Annexes 4 and 5. Annex 5 lists out the construction services and Annex 4 lists services
other than construction.
The Annexes specify the thresholds agreed by the Parties. The threshold for goods
and services other than construction services in respect of central government entities
(Annex 1) has been retained at the pre-existing level of SDR 130,000. In respect of sub-
central entities (Annex 2) the corresponding threshold is SDRs 200,000 for all Parties18
except Canada and USA, which have put a higher figure of SDRs 355,000. In respect of
other entities (Annex 3) this threshold is 400,000 for most Parties, 355,000 for Canada
and Israel and 130,000 for Japan. USA has specified 250,000 SDRs for some entities and
400,000 for others.
For  construction  services  the  general  threshold  for  central  government,  sub-
central and other covered entities is 5 million SDRs, with variations by Israel, Japan and
Korea. Israel has a common threshold of 8.5 million SDRs for all entities. Korea has a
threshold of 5 million for central government entities and 15 million for others. Japan’s
threshold for construction services is 4.5 million for central government entities and 15
million for others. It has stipulated lower threshold for architectural services.
Article XXIV:6 of the Agreement provides for modifications and rectification to
coverage and there is a significant level of activity under this provision. Article XXIV:7
provides inter alia for periodic negotiations to improve the Agreement and particularly to
improve its coverage, the first one being undertaken not later than the end of the third
year  from  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the  Agreement.  Pursuant  to  this  provision
negotiations were promptly undertaken and were going on in 2004.
Some  of  the  significant  features  of  the  Annex-wise  commitments  by  different
Parties (particularly the four major industrialised economies) are described below:
III.4  Annex I: Central or Federal Government Agencies
Generally  Parties  have  listed  all  the  agencies  of  the  Executive  Branch  of
government including the Ministries and Departments. Japan has included even the two
Houses of Legislature and the Supreme Court. The European Communities has listed not
only the European Commission and the Council  of  the  European  Union  but  also  the
Ministries of the 15 member-states. Agencies, institutions, directorates, bureaus and other
establishments  functioning  under  the  Ministries  and  Departments  are  also  included.
Canada, member states of the EC and the USA have generally listed these establishments
while  Japan  has  noted  that  the  “internal  subdivisions,  independent  organs,  attached19
organizations and other organizations and the local branch offices” are included. Korea
states that the “subordinate linear organizations, special local administrative organs, and
attached organs” of central government entities are also included.
While  Parties  have  included  the  Ministry/Department  of  Defence,  they  have
excluded hard core defence items such as arms, ammunition and implements of war, by
means of a negative or positive list.  Annex I entities are less affected than the entities in
other Annexes by the general limitations and country specific derogations specified in the
general and specific notes. However, there are a few product level exclusions. Of note is
the exclusion by Canada, the EC and Korea of procurement of agricultural products for
agricultural  support  programmes  and  human  feeding  programmes.  Some  Parties  have
made exclusions in favour of interest groups that they support as a matter of state policy,
and these apply to Annex I entities as well. Canada and the USA have stated that the
Agreement would not apply to set-asides for small and minority businesses. Japan has
stipulated in Annex I that the Agreement does not apply to “contracts to be awarded to
co-operatives or associations in accordance with laws and regulations existing at the time
of entry into force of the Agreement for Japan". Korea has a similar stipulation in Annex
I in respect of set-asides for small and medium sized enterprises. The EC does not have a
similar exclusion, but it has excluded the suppliers and service providers of Japan, Korea
and the USA from the benefit of Challenge Procedures of Article XX of the Agreement
for contesting the award of contracts to small or medium sized enterprises in the EC. The
exclusion would remain valid “until such time as the EC accepts that they no longer
operate  discriminatory  measures  in  favour  of  certain  domestic  small  and  minority
businesses”. Examples of Party-specific derogations that impinge on the commitments
made in Annex I are the exclusion by the EC from the benefits of the Agreement of
Canada  in  respect  of  procurement  of  general  purpose  automatic  data-processing,
communication equipment and other items and of the USA in respect of air traffic control
equipment.20
III.5  Annex 2: Sub-Central Government entities
Among the major economies the EC has the most comprehensive list in Annex 2.
All contracting authorities of the regional or local public authorities and bodies governed
by public law are included. A body governed by public law means any body established
for the specific purpose of meeting needs in general interest, not having an industrial or
commercial  character,  which  has  legal  personality  and  which  is  either  financed
substantially or controlled in other ways by the State or regional or local authorities. An
indicative list of such bodies and categories of bodies is given in a published document of
the EC. Examples of categories of bodies in the case of Germany are hospitals, public
theatres, nursery schools, refuse and garbage disposal services and large-scale research
institutes.  Japan  has  also  covered  all  59  prefectural  governments  covered  by  local
autonomy laws. Canada promised to give its Annex 2 list by 15 April 1994 but had not
been able to do so until the date of writing (December 2003). The United States has listed
selected entities in 37 of the 50 states. Korea has listed its cities but Hong Kong China
and Singapore have stated that they do not have any sub-Central Governments.
Since  Canada  was  unable  to  list  its  Annex  2  entities  the  EC  made  the
commitments in Annex 2 inapplicable to that Party. As the list of the USA clearly did not
cover all entities at the sub-Central Government level, the response of the EC was to
extend the benefits of the Agreement to the USA only partially, covering suppliers but
not service-providers. Japan has also excluded Canada from the benefit of the Agreement
in respect of Annex 2 entities.
III.6  Annex 3: Other Entities or Utilities
Here  too  the  EEC  list  is  very  comprehensive.  Public  authorities  or  public
undertakings involved in the production, transport or distribution of drinking water or of
electricity are included in the EEC’s Annex 3. Also included are the contracting agencies
connected with railways and airport and port facilities. Canada’s list has a few entities but
none are related to utilities, railways, airport and port facilities (apart from St. Lawrence
Seaway Authority). The USA has listed a few power-related entities as well as some port21
authorities with some exceptions. Tennessee Valley Authority is also included but entities
concerned with airport facilities and drinking water are excluded. Japan has a fairly large
list  of  entities  in  its  Annex  3,  including  those  that  are  related  to  water  resources
development, railways and highways and airport facilities, but excluding electricity and
port facilities.
Sectoral non-application by Parties is prevalent in Annex 3 as much as in Annex
2. The EEC has excluded Canada from the benefits of the Agreement with respect to all
the five categories of entities, Japan with respect to electricity and urban transport and the
USA with respect to drinking water, airport facilities and urban transport. Japan too has
excluded  Canada  from  the  benefit  of  the  Agreement  in  respect  of  Annex  3  entities.
Clearly the non-application is related to lack of reciprocity in the particular sector in most
cases.
III.7  Annexes 4 and 5: Services including Construction Services
There is a commonality among the major economies with respect to Annex 5 in
that  they  have  included  all  the  construction  services  covered  by  Division  51  of  the
Central Product Classification (CPC). However, Annex 4 lists of other services do not
have a common pattern. Canada, the EC and the USA have drawn on the list prepared by
GATT Secretariat in document MTN.GNS/W/120 while Japan has relied on the CPC.
The US list is the most comprehensive, as it has a small negative list that includes all
transportation services, dredging, public utilities services including telecommunications
(except value-added services), research and development and printing services. The other
major economies have all included value-added telecommunication services, computer-
related services, architectural and engineering services, building cleaning services and
sewage and refuse disposal services on the positive list. Accounting, auditing and book
keeping services are included in the lists of Canada and the EC but not that of Japan. The
EC has included some financial services (insurance services and banking and investment
services) but the lists of Canada and Japan exclude these services.22
III.7.1  Basic substantive obligations
As  mentioned  earlier  the  basic  substantive  obligations  of  GPA  1996  are
unconditional  MFN  Treatment  and  National  Treatment.  But  the  unconditional  MFN
treatment is implemented in a very different way from the practice in GATT 1994 or
even in GATS. In GATT1994 the practice is that if during negotiations a member does
not get adequate reciprocity from the principal supplier (or in some cases even substantial
suppliers)  then  the  concession  is  withdrawn  from  the  Schedule  of  Concessions.  The
requirement in GATT 1994 that MFN treatment be unconditional bars the practice of
requiring another member to grant a reciprocal concession as a condition for extension of
MFN  treatment  in  respect  of  a  particular  concession.  Although  GPA  1996  also  has
unconditional MFN treatment as a basic obligation, the practice is at variance with the
principle as it has come to be understood in the context of GATT1994. Not only are there
specific instances of sectoral non-application, but the extension of benefits is modulated
in other ways also. We have seen that in some cases Article XX benefits relating to
Challenge Procedures have been denied to other Parties. These practices are different
from GATS as well, as when departures become necessary in that Agreement a particular
sector  was  exempted  from  the  MFN  obligation  altogether.  There  was  no  instance  of
sectoral non-application to other members being scheduled in specific commitments, as it
has  been  done  in  GPA1996.  Thus  the  principle  of  unconditional  MFN  treatment  in
GPA1996  has  a  unique  feature:  it  applies  only  where  derogation  has  not  been
specifically  stipulated.  In  GATT1994  derogations  are  barred  altogether.  In  GATS
derogations are possible only if MFN exemption has been scheduled.
The  other  basic  obligation  of  national  treatment  has  been  conceived  of  on
traditional lines. Products, services and suppliers of other Parties offering products or
services of the Parties have to be accorded no less favourable treatment than domestic
products,  services  and  suppliers.  Furthermore  discrimination  of  locally  established
suppliers is not permitted on the basis of degree of foreign affiliation or ownership or on
the basis of the country of production of the good or service being supplied.23
The national treatment obligation not only bars price preference but also rules out
any  practice  or  procedure  placing  foreign  products,  services  and  suppliers  at  a
disadvantage. There is an over-riding requirement that the tendering procedures must be
applied on a non-discriminatory manner and there are some specific rules that flow from
this  obligation.  For  instance,  in  the  qualification  of  suppliers,  the  conditions  for
participation must be no less favourable to suppliers of other Parties than to domestic
suppliers. The capacity of the supplier must be judged on the basis both of that supplier’s
global business activity, as well as of its activity in the territory of the procuring entity. In
selective tendering there is the obligation that effective international competition must be
ensured by including the maximum number of domestic suppliers as well as suppliers
from other Parties. The prescribed time limits for submission of tenders must be adequate
to allow suppliers of other Parties as well as domestic suppliers to prepare and submit
tenders. The delivery date must take into account the realistic time required inter alia for
the transport of goods from the points of supply.
III.7.2  Technical Specifications
Technical specifications laying down the characteristics of the product or services
to be procured must not be such that they create unnecessary obstacles to international
trade. In a provision that reproduces the language of the WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers  to  Trade,  GPA1996  requires  that  technical  specifications  prescribed  by  the
procuring entities must, where appropriate, be in terms of performance rather than design
or descriptive characteristics and must be based on international standards where they
exist. Where international standards do not exist they must be based on national technical
regulations,  recognised  national  standards  or  building  codes.  There  must  be  no
requirement  or  reference  to  a  particular  trademark,  design  or  type  or  specific  origin,
producer  or  supplier.  If  such  a  requirement  is  absolutely  necessary,  the  procurement
entity must be ready to accept “equivalent” supplies also.24
III.7.3  Tendering Procedures: Invitation to Participate
The core of the GPA 1996 is devoted to procedures that must be followed in
inviting and processing bids from suppliers of goods and services covered by it.
In all cases of intended procurement by open or selective procedures the invitation
to participate must be published in an appropriate publication, which has been notified by
Parties and is listed in Appendix II of the Agreement. Invitation to participate may be in
the form of a notice of proposed procurement, a notice of planned procurement or  a
notice regarding a qualification system.  In each case full information, as prescribed in
the  Agreement  must  be  given  in  the  notice.  The  tender  document  must  include
information on the address to which tenders or requests for supplementary information
should be sent, the language of submission of the tender, the closing date and time for the
receipt of tender, and the date and time of opening of the tender. It must also provide
information on any economic and technical requirement, financial guarantees required as
well as the technical specifications. Equally importantly it must contain the criteria for
awarding the contract, including any factors other than price that are to be considered in
the evaluation of tenders. Entities must also publish a summary  notice  in  one  of  the
official languages of the WTO. Parties have to inscribe in Appendix III the publication in
which  entities  will  publish  annually  full  details  of  the  permanent  lists  of  qualified
suppliers. If an amendment becomes necessary in the invitation to participate it must be
given the same circulation as the original notice.
It would be relevant to mention here that although the GPA 1996 does not require
the use of information technology, in actual practice a number of GPA Parties, such as
the EC , the US, Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, and Japan have taken advantage
of  the  evolving  technology  for  facilitating  access  to  information  on  procurement
opportunities, legislation, decisions etc.
Deadlines have been prescribed for submission of tenders to ensure that suppliers
from other Parties get adequate time. The norm is not less than 40 days from the date of
publication of the original notice to participate. An additional time of 25 days must be25
allowed in the case of selective procedures not involving the use of a permanent list of
qualified suppliers. The minimum time limits may be reduced to 25 and even 10 days in
certain circumstances. Tender documentation provided to suppliers must contain all the
information necessary to permit suppliers to submit responsive tenders. The Agreement
lists these items of information.
In  order  to  safeguard  against  possible  discrimination  the  Agreement  contains
obligations on technical specifications to which we have already referred.
The Agreement permits recourse to limited tendering in certain situations e.g., in
the absence of response to an open or selective tender, when the supplies can be made
only by specific suppliers, for reasons of extreme urgency etc. In such cases the above
procedures need not be followed.
III.7.4  Tendering Procedures: Submission, Receipt and Opening of tenders and
Awarding of Contracts
Tenders must normally be submitted in writing directly or by mail. Opportunity
must  be  given  to  tenderers  to  correct  unintentional  errors.  Importantly,  all  tenders  in
response to open or selective procedures must be received and opened under procedures
and conditions that guarantee the regularity of the openings. The award must be made to
the tenderer who has been determined to be fully capable of undertaking the contract, and
whose tender is either the lowest or the most advantageous in terms of the evaluation
criteria. Negotiations are permitted if it has been indicated in the invitation to participate
or if it appears from evaluation that no one tender is obviously the most advantageous in
terms of the specific evaluation criteria set forth in the notices or tender documentation.
Undue  advantage  must  not  be  given  to  any  tenderer  during  negotiations,  and  when
negotiations are concluded they must all be given a common deadline for submission of
the final tenders.26
III.7.5  Information and Review Provisions
Entities are required to publish full information on the award of contract in a
publication listed in Appendix II within 72 days  of the award, including the name and
address of winning tenderer, value of the winning award and type of procedure used. The
suppliers of Parties have the right to seek an explanation of procurement practices and
procedures and information concerning failure to qualify as a supplier or win a particular
tender.
Parties  are  required  to  publish  any  law,  regulation,  judicial  decision,
administrative  ruling  of  general  application  and  any  procedure  regarding  government
procurement in an appropriate publication listed in Appendix IV of the Agreement. The
governments  have  also  to  be  ready  to  respond  to  requests  from  other  Parties  for
information on the contract award that may be necessary to provide assurance that the
decision on procurement was made fairly and impartially. In addition Parties are also
required to submit on an annual basis detailed statistics on the award of contracts by the
covered entities, broken down by entity and by categories of products and services.
III.7.6  Challenge Procedures and Dispute Settlement
An innovation in GPA 1996 is the introduction of procedures enabling suppliers
to challenge alleged breaches of the Agreement. Challenges must be heard by a court or
by an impartial and independent review body “with no interest in the outcome of the
procurement  and the members of which are secure from external influence during the
term of appointment”. A review body must either be a court or must follow quasi-judicial
procedures. The procedures must provide for rapid interim measures to correct breaches
of the Agreement and to preserve commercial opportunities. There must be the possibility
to suspend the procurement process or correct the breach or compensate for the loss or
damages suffered.27
The Agreement provides for recourse to the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) of the WTO, with some additional rules and procedures contained in paragraphs 2
to  7  of  Article  XXII.  As  provided  in  Article  1.2  and  Appendix  1  of  the  DSU  the
Committee on Government Procurement has adopted a decision on the application of the
DSU with the additional and special rules contained in the afore-mentioned provisions.
One important special rule  is that there is no possibility of cross retaliation across other
multilateral or plurilateral agreements in any dispute relating to GPA 1996.
III.7.7  Promoting transparency in countries not Parties to the Agreement
GPA1996 contains a provision aimed at promoting transparency in countries that
are not Parties to the Agreement. It envisages that if certain conditions are met by a
country that is not a Party, they could not only be given observer status in the Committee
on Government Procurement, but also access to procurement by entities of Parties on
specified  terms.  Two  of  these  conditions  are  that  the  country  must  comply  with  the
requirements  of  the  Agreement  in  respect  of  technical  specifications  and  publish  the
procurement notices inviting participation as per the Agreement. In the summary notice it
must indicate also the terms and conditions under which tenders would be entertained
from suppliers situated in countries Parties to Agreement. In addition the country must be
willing to ensure that the procurement regulations would not normally be changed during
a procurement, and in case changes have to be made unavoidably the country must ensure
the availability of a satisfactory means of redress.
IV  Procurement Policies and Practices in India
3
India has a federal constitution, with the responsibility for governance divided
between  the  central  and  state  governments.  The  Union  List,  the  State  List,  and  the
Concurrent List in the Indian Constitution govern the legislative functions of the central
and state governments. The Parliament has exclusive powers to make laws on matters
enumerated in the Central List, and the state legislatures on matters listed in the State List
                                                          
3  The description of the procurement policies and practices given here is drawn largely from the Country
Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) of June 2001 drawn up by the World Bank.28
with respect to its jurisdiction (Article 246). With regard to the Concurrent List also the
state legislature may make laws provided that these laws do not conflict with the central
act on the subject. Notwithstanding the distribution of legislative powers, the Constitution
gives the Parliament wide authority to enact laws even with regard to matters falling
under the State List. According to Article 249 the Parliament can make laws on matters
enumerated in the State List if the Rajya Sabha declares by resolution by not less than
two-thirds of the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the
national interest to do so. Article 253 also empowers the Parliament to make laws for
implementing any international treaty, agreement or convention. According to Article
248 the parliament has exclusive powers to make any laws on any matter not enumerated
in the Concurrent or the State List. Since government procurement does not figure in  any
of the lists, the Parliament would seem to have full powers to enact legislation on the
subject. While state governments generally follow the same procurement procedures as
the central government, the latter has not exercised its residual legislative authority in this
regard to enforce uniform or improved procedures.
The  Public  Sector  Undertakings  (PSUs)  of  the  Government  of  India  can  be
divided broadly into three categories. These are: organisations, which are a part of the
ministry  or  department,  such  as  the  Indian  Railways  and  the  Department  of
Telecommunications; statutory bodies such as the Life Insurance Corporation of India,
Food  Corporation  of  India  etc.;  and  companies  set  up  under  the  provisions  of  the
Companies Act, 1956. The departmental undertakings falling in the first category follow
the government procurement procedures fully. The statutory undertakings are not bound
by the same rules but their functioning is subject to Parliamentary scrutiny  and their
accounts  are  audited  by  the  Comptroller  and  Auditor  General.  The  PSUs,  which  are
incorporated as companies are more independent of government control. There are state
level PSUs as well, which are controlled by the state governments. The most important of
these are the State Electricity Boards.
We outline below the main features of the procurement policies at the levels of
central government, state governments and central public sector enterprises.29
IV.1  Central Government and its Agencies
IV.1.1  General Rules and Evolution of Procurement Policy
The general rules governing expenditure on government account laid down in the
General  Financial  Rules,  1963  (GFR)  and  the  Delegation  of  Financial  Powers,  1978
(DFPR) govern expenditure on procurement as well. No expenditure may be incurred
unless there is a provision for it in the Demand for Grants of the Ministry or Department
approved by the Parliament for a particular year, and unless such expenditure has been
sanctioned by the general or special orders of Government or by an authority to which
power has been duly delegated. A Government of India Decision under Rule 6 of the
GFR lays down rules that are more specific to government procurement. The relevant
part of the Decision is quoted below:
‘(vi)  The  responsibility  and  accountability  of  every  authority  delegated  with
financial powers to procure any item on Government account is total and indivisible.
Government expects that the authority concerned will have the public interest uppermost
in its mind while making a procurement decision. This responsibility is not discharged
merely  by  the  selection  of  the  cheapest  offer  but  must  conform  to  the  following
yardsticks of financial propriety: -
(a) Whether the offers have been invited in accordance with governing rules and after
following a fair and reasonable procedure in the prevailing circumstances.
(b) Whether the authority is satisfied that the selected offer will adequately meet the
requirement for which it is being procured.
(c) Whether the price on offer is reasonable and consistent with the quality required.
(d) Above all, whether the offer being accepted is the most appropriate one taking all
relevant factors into account and in keeping with the standards of financial propriety?30
(vii) Wherever called for, the concerned authority must place on record in precise
terms, the considerations which weighed with it while taking the procurement decision.’
Chapter 8 of the GFR contains the general rules applicable to all departments
regarding  government  procurement  of  goods  (‘stores  required  for  use  in  the  public
service’). The overall policy orientation relating to government procurement, which is a
legacy of the pre-1991 economic reforms era, is contained in the Preamble to the Rules in
Part I of Appendix 8 of GFR in the following terms:
‘The policy of Government is to make purchases of stores for the public service in
such a way as to encourage development of indigenous production of stores to the utmost
possible  extent  and  to  make  the  country  self-sufficient  in  the  matter  of  its  own
requirements.’
The  Preamble  goes  on  to  elaborate  the  manner  in  which  the  above  general
principle must be implemented and lays down a hierarchy of preferences through which
the policy of self-sufficiency must be implemented. The first preference must go to goods
wholly  produced  in  India,  second  to  goods  manufactured  in  India  from  imported
materials,  third  to  foreign  manufactures  held  in  stock  in  India  and  last  to  imported
products offers for which have been received for supply through Indian Agents or India-
based establishments. In addition, the purchasing entities have been given the discretion
to accord price preference to domestically produced products over imported ones and to
article produced by cottage and small-scale industry over those manufactured by larger
ones.
Pursuant to the above policy government ministries and departments granted price
and purchase preference to domestic over imported supplies. In addition, preference was
granted to the PSUs over the private sector and to cottage and the small-scale industries
over the large-scale ones. A purchase preference to supplies from the PSUs was already
in vogue since the inception of the Industrial Policy Resolution in 1956. In addition, in
1980 the Bureau of Public Enterprises issued a circular mandating central government31
ministries and departments as well as PSUs to grant a price preference to PSUs up to 10
per cent and even more in appropriate cases. A practice that actually prevailed was that if
the price quoted by a PSU was within 10 per cent of the lowest quotation, negotiations
were held with the PSU and the tender awarded to it at that quoted amount. The cottage
and small-scale sector also received compulsory purchase and price preference. In 1996,
out of the 836 products reserved for manufacture by the small-scale sector, as many as
412  were  required  to  be  procured  exclusively  from  small-scale  firms,  four  from  the
handicrafts sector and  another 14  from the handloom sector.  In addition the Director
General of Supplies and Disposal was mandated to procure non-reserved products also
from the small-scale sector to the extent their supplies were technically comparable to
those from larger firms (Debroy and Pursell, 1997).
The policy prescriptions cited above are the product of the times when India’s
economic  policy  was  inward  looking.  Things  changed  following  the  introduction  of
economic reforms in 1991-92. Now Rule 102 (3) of the GFR prohibits any purchase
preference  given  to  domestic  suppliers  over  the  duty  paid  price  of  imports.  Price
preference  for  PSUs  was  also  discontinued  and  replaced  by  purchase  preference.
However, it is the declared intention of Government to eliminate purchase preference as
well in due course. The purchase preference policy for the public sector enterprises is
being  extended  from  year  to  year  (World  Bank,  2001).The  policies  of  preference  to
small-scale and cottage industries have, however, continued, albeit the list of products is
somewhat smaller.
IV.1.2  Organisation of Procurement in Central Government
The  Directorate  General  of  Supplies  &  Disposals  (DGS&D)  under  the
Department of Supply was earlier the central organisation for procurement of supplies of
the Government of India. Procurement operations were centralised and all ministries and
departments,  except  those  in  which  procurement  operations  were  substantial  (viz.,
Railways,  Posts  and  Telegraphs  and  Defence),  were  directed  to  obtain  their  supplies
through the DGS&D. The process of decentralisation had already begun earlier but a
major reorganisation took place in 1992 following the introduction of economic reforms.32
All Ministries are now authorised to procure goods for their use, and the DGS&D’s role
is limited to procurement of items of common use by more than one Ministry. DGS&D
finalises the rate and running contracts for items of common use and individual ministries
are compulsorily required to make use of these contracts. After 1992 small procurement
units were created in some Ministries such as Home Affairs, Health and Family Planning
and Information and Broadcasting.
The  Central  Public  Works  Department  (CPWD),  an  attached  office  of  the
Ministry  of  Urban  Development,  is  the  central  organisation  for  the  construction  and
maintenance of central government buildings and other capital assets in India and abroad.
The Ministries of Railways and Defence were always exempted from the requirement to
go  through  the  CPWD  and  there  has  been  further  decentralisation  over  time.  A  few
Ministries  such  as  the  Post  &  Telegraph  Department  under  the  Ministry  of
Communications,  the  Ministry  of  Information  and  Broadcasting  and  the  Ministry  of
Forest and Environment have their own organisations for the execution of works.
The Ministry of Railways has always functioned independently of the Department
of Supply as it has large procurement operations. The Stores Department of that Ministry
is responsible for procurement of all goods with the exception of rails and rail fittings, the
procurement  of  which  is  handled  by    its  Civil  Engineering  Department.  The  Civil
Engineering Department also handles procurement of civil engineering works, while the
responsibility for electrical works lies with the Electrical Engineering Department and for
signalling  and  telecommunications  works  with  the  Signal  and  Telecommunications
Department.
The  Department  of  Telecommunications  (DOT)  and  the  Department  of
Telecommunication Services (DTS) were formerly big procuring entities but after their
corporatisation in October 2000 the procurement function has passed on to the BSNL and
other companies.33
Another Ministry with sizeable procurement operations is the Ministry of Surface
Transport  (MOST).  It  has  two  Departments,  the  Department  of  Shipping  and  the
Department  of  Road  Transport  and  Highways.  The  latter  is  responsible  for  the
development and maintenance of national highways. Until 1995, all works relating to
national highways were executed by the State PWD in which it was situated. The MOST
provided the budget and maintained technical and financial control. However, after the
establishment of the National Highways Authority of India by an Act of Parliament in
1988, the responsibility for construction has been gradually shifting to the Authority.
IV.1.3  Procurement Procedures and Transparency in Government of India
Bidding systems: Rule 2 in Appendix 8 of the GFR contains the basic rule, which
is quoted below:
“Tenders shall be invited in India and abroad also, when considered desirable for
the supply of all article which are purchased under Rules 1 to 4 unless the value of the
order to be placed is small or the Head of the Department is satisfied that sufficient
reasons which shall be recorded in writing, exist that it is not in the public interest to call
for  tenders.  No  tender  which  fails  to  comply  with  the  conditions  as  to  delivery  and
payment prescribed in Rule 1 shall be accepted.”
Important agencies, such the DGS&D, CPWD and the Railways have their own
manuals or comprehensive instructions, which are followed for procurement operations.
The DGS&D and CPWD manuals serve as a model for other ministries and departments
that have smaller scale procurement operations. The manuals and the basic financial rules
on which they are based are in the nature of internal instructions and are devoid of legal
force. They cannot be legally enforced in a court of law.
Four basic types of procedures are utilised by the procurement agencies. Cash
purchase is made for petty purchase of goods or works. Even here, as a general rule, a
minimum of three quotations is obtained from suppliers and the order given to the lowest.
Proprietary purchase of such items  as spares is made by inviting single tender from34
manufacturer or supplier in cases in which no purpose would be served by inviting bids
from  other  sources.  The  Railways  have  the  practice  of  issuing  open  tender  even  for
proprietary purchase in cases involving large purchases, with a view to exploring the
market for  acceptable  alternatives. The proprietary item may still be purchased but a
development order may be placed for promising substitutes. In limited tender the bids are
sent to pre-selected firms on the list of approved suppliers/contractors in cases where the
value of procurement is not very high. Limited tenders procedures are also resorted to for
urgent  requirement,  particularly  in  the  case  of  works.  The  Railways  use  a  variety  of
limited tender known as bulletin tender, in which a weekly list of small value tenders is
published  in  a  bulletin  and  sent  to  registered  suppliers  of  the  item  concerned.  Open
tenders in which the bid documents are sent to all firms that wish to participate are the
norm in the Government of India for the procurement of goods. For the procurement of
works, participation in the open tenders is restricted to approved contractors, including
those registered in the appropriate classes by the procurement agency (CPWD, Railways,
Military  Engineering  Services,  etc.).  Restricted  open  tenders  are  also  used  for
procurement of specialised and safety items, including those in which type approval has
been given earlier. In open tenders, bids may be invited nationally or globally. Single
tender  is  employed  to  meet  emergency  situations,  such  as  in  works  to  meet  natural
disasters.
Registration of suppliers/contractors: Rule 4 in Appendix 8 of the GFR requires
DGS&D to maintain a list of registered firms, but in practice all government procurement
agencies  maintain  such  lists.  The  credentials  of  registered  suppliers,  including  their
financial capability, are verified in advance. For this purpose they are required to submit
detailed information including their organisational structure, manufacturing/stocking and
trading capabilities, financial strength, past experience etc. The registration is valid for a
fixed period, but if the performance is satisfactory it is renewed. A similar procedure is
followed for works, in which the procurement  agencies  generally  classify  contractors
according to their capability. To help in the classification, the contractors have to furnish
details of contracts executed by them in the past. The criteria for registration that existed
in the DOT (before corporatisation) included working capital, solvency certificate limit,35
value of each of the latest three completed contracts in the previous five years, and work
execution  turnover.  Distinct  from  the  system  of  registered  suppliers  is  the  pre-
qualification of bidders adopted for procurement of a particular work of large value. Bids
for pre-qualification are invited through advertisement in the press and a short list drawn
up on the basis of pre-specified criteria. Another tender system in vogue for high value
complex  projects  is  that  of  Two  Envelope  Bidding  Procedures.  The  two  envelopes
contain the “Technical Bid” and the “Financial Bid” separately. This system enables the
bidders to seek clarification if any on technical aspects and to submit any modification of
the financial bid on that basis. The original bid as well as the modification is taken into
consideration for the purpose of drawing up the comparative statement.
Procedural aspects of the invitation of bids: Standard documents drawn up by the
DGS&D for supply of goods and those drawn up by the CPWD for works are used by
other  procurement  agencies  as  well.  For  stores  (goods)  these  contain  inter  alia
instructions  to  bidders,  schedule  giving  description  of  stores,  quantity,  delivery
requirement, special conditions, if any, and conditions of contract. In the case of works,
the  standard  document  includes  guidelines  for  use  of  standard  forms,  instructions  to
bidders,  conditions  of  contract,  bill  of  quantities  and  bid  forms.  In  addition  standard
specifications  for  materials  and  works,  schedule  of  rates,  and  general  and  detailed
drawings  are  included  in  the  bidding  documents  for  works.  Indian  Standards
Specifications are normally used, but where these are not appropriate or not available,
international specifications or those prepared by the organisation itself are used. In the
case of works standard CPWD specifications are used, and in their absence, the relevant
Indian Standards codes or international specifications. Bid security by way of an earnest
money deposit of 2% of the estimated value of the bid is the norm in India. It has been
observed that the tender documents used in most cases do not clearly specify the criterion
and methodology for selection of the bidder, leaving considerable room for arbitrariness.
Invitations of open bids (generally known as open tender) contain not only a brief
description of the goods or works but also other essential information such as eligibility
criteria,  availability  of  tender  documents,  cost  of  the  documents,  date  and  place  for36
submission of tender etc. The notices are issued in the Indian Trade Journal, which is the
main medium for publishing tender notices. In addition they are published in the national
and regional dailies approved by the Directorate of Advertisement and Visual Publicity.
For local bidding tender notices are also published in the local language of the region.
Global tenders are also sent to the commercial attaches and foreign missions as well as
Indian missions abroad. CPWD sends copies of its notices to registered associations of
contractors.
For global tenders the minimum time given for submission of bids is eight weeks,
for other open tenders six weeks, and for limited tender four weeks. Further a margin of
15  days  is  allowed  for  sending  the  tender  notice  in  time  for  publication  in  the
International Trade Journal. Sale of tender documents is unrestricted for goods, but for
works it is generally restricted to the class of contractors specified in the notice. Pre-bid
conferences are generally held for major works,  and at these  conferences bidders are
entitled  to  ask  for  clarifications.  A  summary  of  the  discussions  at  these  conferences,
including the points raised and the clarifications given, is furnished to all prospective
bidders.
Submission and opening of bids: The tender notice invariably mentions the time
and date by which the bids must be received and also indicates the person responsible for
receiving them. Most purchasing organisations maintain a tender box in which all bids
received against a particular notice are dropped. The officer responsible for purchases
opens all tenders received in time at the specified place and time in the presence of the
tenderers  desirous  of  being  present.  At  the  time  of  opening  a  list  is  made  of  the
representatives present and their signatures are obtained on the list. As the tenders are
opened each of them is numbered serially and initialled. Essential information such as the
price,  delivery  period  etc.  as  quoted  by  the  tenderer  is  circled  and  initialled  by  the
designated officer at the time of opening. Any corrections, alterations, or overwriting in
the offer are also circled and initialled. At the time of opening relevant particulars of each
bid are also read out for the information of those present. A statement is also prepared
indicating particulars of the tenders received. The bids are then scrutinised closely and a37
comparative  statement  prepared,  showing  clearly  the  price,  specification,  description,
quantity, delivery period, and other essential details. A technical scrutiny and evaluation
of the bids is undertaken in the case of items like machinery and equipment. In some
purchasing  organisations  the  valuation  is  done  by  a  committee  constituted  for  the
purpose. Negotiations are conducted if the bids are considered to be high as compared to
the estimated rates or if bidders do not agree to terms and conditions of the contract. The
rules provide that negotiations must be resorted to only as an exception and must not be
held merely to bring down the rates. When negotiations are considered necessary, all
responding  bidders  are  invited.  On  completion  of  the  evaluation  the  purchase  officer
prepares  a  comprehensive  proposal  and  submits  it  to  the  competent  authority.  The
proposal  covers  inter  alia  technical  acceptability  of  the  offer,  technical  and  financial
ability of the firms  falling  in  the  zone  of  consideration,  delivery  period  vis-à-vis  the
requirement, reasonableness of the quoted price and any other relevant information. The
last purchase price in a not too old procurement serves as benchmark for judging the
reasonableness of the rates. Generally the bid adjudged to be the most economical is
selected,  but  there  are  instances  also  of  splitting  of  quantity  among  several  bidders.
Generally the recommendations of the tender evaluation committee or of the purchasing
officer  pass  through  intermediate  hierarchical  levels  before  being  considered  by  the
competent authority.
The designated authority competent to approve the purchase under the delegation
of powers accepts tenders on the basis of the evaluation. Any purchase of a value of more
than 50 million requires the concurrence of the Ministry of Finance. For lower amounts
powers have been delegated to Heads of Department and officials lower down in the
hierarchy. For instance, in the Directorate General of Supplies & Disposal, the Director
General  has  powers  for  purchases  of  Rupees  40-50  million,  the  Additional  Director
General for Rupees 15-40 million and so on.
Award of contracts: In the area of goods there are two types of contracts, Ad Hoc
contract and Rate Contract/ Running Contract. An Ad Hoc contract covers a one-time
demand  where  the  quantity  is  fixed.  In  a  Rate  Contract  the  contractor  undertakes  to38
supply any quantity of materials on demand at fixed rates, during the currency of the
contract.  In  a  Running  Contract  the  contractor  agrees  to  supply  and  the  purchasing
agency agrees to receive a specified quantity of materials, as and when ordered, at fixed
rates. In the area of works, there are four types of contract. In percentage rate contract,
used for minor works, bidders are required to quote and contracts are awarded on the
basis of a percentage below or above the standard schedule of rates maintained by the
purchasing  agency.  In  item  rate  contract,  normally  used  in  contracts  for  bridges  and
buildings, the rates and quantities are specified against each item of work. In piecework
contract, small items of work are awarded on the basis of spot quotations. In lump sum
contracts, bids are invited and contracts awarded for the entire project, which usually
large and complex.
The procurement procedures do not provide for any remedies against perceived
lack of fairness in the award of tenders. However, once a contract has been awarded,
there is provision for arbitration for the settlement of disputes. Most contracts in the areas
of goods as well as services contain a clause, which enables either party to take recourse
to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the provisions of law. The Arbitration
and Conciliation Act 1996, provides for conciliation as a first step towards resolving
disputes.
Central government procurement procedures and practices and the  GPA 1996:
How do the Central  government procedures  measure  up  to  the  requirements  of  GPA
1996? As far as transparency is concerned it would appear that on many aspects the
prescribed  procedures  are  broadly  in  line  with  the  requirements  of  the  plurilateral
agreement. This is the case in respect of procedures relating to invitation to participate
regarding  intended  procurement,  selection  procedures,  time  limits  for  tendering  and
delivery, submission, receipt and opening of tenders. With respect to these phases, the
criticism is of deviations from the rules in practice rather than of the absence of rules.
Some of these practices are selective/restrictive advertisement, selective sale of tender
documents, substitution of documents, permitting and soliciting modification of bid after
public  opening,  deliberate  delay  in  processing  of  tenders,  selective  leaking  of39
information, and splitting awards for no good reason (World Bank, 2001). There are,
however, some more significant shortcomings in the Indian practice and rules in respect
of some other aspects of the procedures. As noted above, the tender documentation does
not always clearly specify the criteria for awarding the contract as required in paragraph 2
(h) of Article XII of the GPA 1996. Further Article XIV requires that negotiations can be
held in cases in which the intention to negotiate is notified in the invitation to suppliers,
or when it appears that no one tender is obviously the most advantageous. In the Central
government,  negotiations  are  held  in  a  routine  manner  with  the  lowest  bidder.
Furthermore there is no requirement for debriefing for the benefit of the unsuccessful
bidders as required in paragraph 3 of Article XVIII, or for publication of contract awards,
as required in paragraph 2 of that article. More importantly, formal appeal or challenge
procedures, which are required by Article XX are not in existence. The CPAR (World
Bank, 2001) contains recommendations to the Government of India for streamlining of
government procurement procedures, which if implemented will make these procedures
fully compatible with the requirements of GPA 1996.
On  the  more  substantive  aspects  of  non-discrimination  in  government
procurement there is no departure in India from the MFN principle. Even with respect to
national treatment there would be less difficulty now than was the case in the era before
the 1991 economic reforms in meeting the requirement if India were to join GPA 1996.
Explicit  price  preferences  stipulated  earlier  in  favour  of  public  sector  suppliers  has
already been given up. Purchase preference for other domestic suppliers has been phased
out,  and  while  it  is  being  temporarily  extended  to  public  sector  enterprises,  it  is  the
declared  intention  of  government  to  eliminate  this  also.  All  that  remains  now  is  the
preference for small-scale and cottage industries, but it is arguable that this preference is
on par with the exemption that some of the major GPA 1996 signatories have obtained in
respect of small enterprises.
IV.1.4  Procurement of Consultancy Services
The  above  analysis  of  the  procurement  policies  and  procedures  in  the  central
government relates only to purchases of goods and contracts for public works. In these40
areas procurement operations have been going on from the pre-independence era, and the
policies  and  practices  have  evolved  over  many  decades.  Manuals  and  other  detailed
instructions have been in existence for a long time. The position is not the same in respect
of  consultancy  contracts.  Traditionally  the  practice  has  been  to  rely  on  the  expertise
residing  in  various  ministries  and  departments  of  governments.  As  government
established its own consulting organisations (e.g. RITES under Ministry of Railways, EIL
under Ministry of Petroleum, EDCIL under Ministry of Human Resources, TCIL under
Ministry of Telecommunications, Hospital Consultancy Organisation under Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare, and MECON under Ministry of Steel) government agencies
developed a preference of warding consultancy contracts to them by negotiation. The
Ministry of Railways, the Ministry of Urban Development and the Ministry of Surface
Transport are the main central government agencies that procure consultancy services.
Uniform procedures for procurement of consultancy services have not yet been
developed in the central government and individual procurement operations are carried
out on an ad hoc basis. The Ministry of Railways has issued guidelines but standardised
documents have not been compiled. In 1994 the Ministry of Finance had approved and
recommended a standard bidding document for consultancy contracts but the document
has remained a dead letter.
In  the  Ministry  of  Railways  selection  of  consultants  is  done  after  inviting
proposals  from  3-6  firms  about  whose  qualification  and  experience  information  is
available. In the Ministry of Urban Development (CPWD) advertisement is issued calling
for expression of interest from qualified firms. The short-listed consultants are issued the
terms of reference and asked to submit price bids and technical proposals in separate
envelopes. A committee evaluates the technical proposals and the price bids of only those
bidders  are  opened  which  qualify  in  respect  of  the  technical  proposals.  Marks  are
assigned for both technical proposals and financial bids, and in the overall evaluation a
ratio of 80-20 or 70-30 is adopted for the technical proposals and financial bids.  The
Ministry  of  Surface  Transport  has  a  continuous  system  of  empanelment  or  pre-
qualification of consultants. Sometimes selection of consultants is made  after seeking41
letters of interest  through  open  advertisements.  The  applicants  are  short-listed  on  the
basis of a marking system in which maximum marks are allocated for the qualification
and  experience  of  key  personnel  and  for  previous  experience  in  similar  assignments.
Short-listed or pre-qualified consultants
are then issued the terms of reference and asked to submit their proposals. Two
types of selection procedures are in use. The consultant may be selected on the basis of
the technical proposal and then called for negotiation of fees. Or the decision may be
taken  on  the  basis  of  a  combination  of  technical  and  financial  proposal  with  the
weightage of 80:20. Technical proposals are evaluated on the basis of numerical rating,
the  maximum  marks  being  allocated  to  expertise  of  key  personnel,  adequacy  of  the
proposed work plan, and prior experience in similar assignments.
Judged  against  the  yardstick  of  the  requirements  of  GPA  1996  the  same
deficiencies are seen as in the procurement of goods and in contracts for works. The
evaluation criteria for bids are not well defined, there is no debriefing of unsuccessful
bidders and absence of a challenge mechanism in which the appropriateness of the award
can be contested.
IV.2  Procurement in state governments
The CPAR (World Bank 2001) contains profiles of the procurement procedures
and practices in three of the Indian states, viz., Karnataka, Tamilnadu, and Uttar Pradesh.
The following paragraphs give an outline of these profiles.
In Karnataka, public procurement was governed by a host of rules, directives,
codes, and manuals issued by various departments, until all these were replaced by the
Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurement Act 1999 (KTPP Act), which entered into
effect  on  October  24,  2000.  The  KTTP  Act  is  equally  applicable  to  government
departments, local bodies, PSUs, Universities etc. The statute requires wide publicity and
easy  availability  of  tender  documents,  recourse  to  open  tender  except  in  specified
circumstances,  prior  disclosure  of  criteria  for  eligibility,  qualification  and  evaluation,42
publication of award of contracts together with the reasons for the decision and the right
to appeal for  aggrieved tenderers.  In some respects  the  new  statute  places  Karnataka
procurement  procedures  ahead  of  the  procedures  in  the  Central  government  and  its
agencies,  as  far  as  conformity  with  the  practice  in  developed  countries  and  with  the
requirements of the GPA 1996 are concerned. Nevertheless, a number of deficiencies
have been noted even in the new statute (World Bank 2001). For instance, negotiations
are held, not exceptionally but in a routine fashion to push down further the price quoted
by the lowest tenderer. This militates against efficiency in the tendering system, as it
leads  to  the  practice  of  the  bidders  providing  a  cushion  for  negotiations  in  their
quotations.  Further  the  aggrieved  bidder’s  right  to  appeal  is  not  to  an  independent
statutory tribunal, but to the Head of the Department or the Government.
The Tamilnadu Transparency in Tenders Act 1998 was enacted even before the
corresponding legislation in Karnataka and it came into effect on October 1, 2000. It has
broadly  the  same  essential  features  and  shortcomings  as  described  in  the  case  of
Karnataka.
Unlike Karnataka and Tamilnadu, Uttar Pradesh has not introduced any law to
govern public procurement in the state. As in the case of the Central government, the
financial rules and orders, directives, and procedures issued by government departments
from  time  to  time  provide  the  guidelines  for  procurement  operations.  The  basic
requirements are the same as in the central government, viz., public invitation of tenders
(except for small value purchases) and selection of lowest tenderer, which is adjudged to
be capable. Selective and single tenders are permitted in appropriate circumstances. The
main deficiencies are the same as in the Central government. Unsuccessful tenderers do
not have the right to know the reasons for the rejection of their bids. There is no system
of statutory review of their grievance. The following shortcomings of tender documents
have been listed by the World Bank (World Bank, 2001):
‘- Time for bid submission is unrealistic.
-  Qualifications for eligible bidders are rarely stated.43
-  When stated they are often inappropriate for the works and discriminatory.
-  Technical specifications (for equipment) are skewed.
-  Criteria and methodology for evaluation and comparison are rarely disclosed.
-  When disclosed they are often discriminatory.
-  Bid and performance Securities are not always mandated.
-  When mandated they are often ridiculously low for large contracts.
-  The conditions of contract place most of the risks on the supplier/contractor.
-  Payment terms are not in line with market practice.
-  There is no sanction or interest for delay in payments.’
These examples of malpractice reflect the poor levels of governance of the state,
which is one of the most backward in the country.
IV.3  Procurement by Central Government Enterprises
The economic policies followed in India immediately after independence entailed
that government should assume direct responsibility for industries of basic and strategic
importance.  Government  enterprises  were  consequently  set  up  covering  many  areas,
including  heavy  industry,  iron  and  steel,  non-ferrous  metals,  oil  and  gas,  coal,
telecommunication equipment. In the subsequent decades the public sector was expanded
to cover most of the important services  such  as  insurance  and  banking,  railways,  air
transport,  shipping  and  telecommunications,  in  most  cases  operating  monopolistic
enterprises.  Two  of  the  basic  aims  of  government  were  to  prevent  concentration  of
economic power and to stabilise market forces. But government enterprises also served as
important tools for advancing overall socio-economic objectives such as self-reliance,
import substitution, employment generation, advancement of technology, development of
backward regions and uplift of backward classes. While it was originally envisaged that
the  public  sector  enterprises  would  function  as  commercial  enterprises  the  socio-
economic objectives with which they were burdened implied that this was not to be the
case. The Bureau of Public Enterprises issued guidelines to these undertakings on the
policies  and  practices  to  be  followed  by  them  on  many  aspects  of  their  functioning
including procurement of goods and services. Some of the undertakings were statutory44
corporations but most were incorporated as companies under the Indian Companies Act,
1956, but in all of them the central government had a majority share. Government could
thus effectively control their functioning. Many of them ran into substantial losses and
needed government grants and guarantee to keep them afloat. This gave to government
even greater handle to control their policies.
With the introduction of economic reforms in 1991 the policy on public sector
enterprises underwent radical transformation. Large areas that were hitherto reserved for
enterprises in the public sector were opened up for investment by the private sector. It
was decided that public sector investment in future would focus on strategic, high-tech
and essential infrastructure. Among other things an ambitious policy of divestment in
public sector enterprises was introduced. Sick units were to be investigated with a view to
seeing if they could be revived or rehabilitated. As of March 2000 there were 240 public
sector enterprises under  the  central  government,  of  which  67  were  sick  and  32  were
earmarked for divestment, leaving as many as 141, which are to be retained (World Bank,
2001).
The procurement policies and practices of seven major public sector undertakings
(Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., Coal India Ltd., National Thermal Power Corporation
Ltd., Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd., Steel Authority
of  India  Ltd.,  and  Mahanagar  Telephone  Nigam  Ltd.  have  been  analysed  in  the
CPAR(World  Bank  2001).  The  enterprises  follow  generally  the  same  policies  and
procedures  in  procurement  as  in  the  central  government  viz.  widely  advertised  open
tenders for procurement of a large magnitude, limited tenders  for  purchases  of small
value,  and  single  tenders  for  proprietary  items  or  in  certain  situations.  Transparency
practices in respect of tender procedures, bidding documents, bid evaluation criteria etc.
are also generally the same as in the central government, although there are differences
among the enterprises on matters of detail. Their deficiencies are also the same as in the
government viz. negotiations are held with the lowest bidder as a matter of routine, award
of contract is split among tenderers on the basis of the lowest quotation, debriefing is not
done for the benefit of unsuccessful tenderers, and there are no bid challenge procedures45
in  which  an  aggrieved  bidder  can  appeal  the  decision  to  an  independent  body.  As
mentioned earlier, with respect to domestic preferences  the earlier practice of 10 % price
preference for government departments and other public enterprises has been withdrawn
and replaced by a purchase preference. Under the current policy, if the price quoted by
the supplying public sector enterprise is within 10 % of the lowest bid, other things such
as  quality  and  delivery  schedule  being  equal,  the  contract  has  to  be  awarded  to  that
enterprise at the lowest price. Government renews this purchase preference directive year
to year, and the last government notification was valid until 31 March 2004.
V  Issues that have arisen in the Working Group on Transparency in
Government Procurement
Between  the  First  and  the  Fifth  Ministerial  Session  at  the  meetings  of  the
Working Group  WTO members discussed the rationale of a multilateral framework in
this area and the possible elements that should constitute such a framework. While some
members supported an agreement in the area, others expressed doubts on the need for
such an agreement and attempted to whittle down the proposed elements to the maximum
extent  possible.  As  alluded  to  already,  the  agreement  at  Doha  on  the  need  for  a
multilateral framework on transparency in government procurement did not result in a
significant  change  in  the  trend  of  post-Doha  discussions.  A  number  of  members,
including  India  and  Malaysia  in  particular,  have  remained  unreceptive  to  the  idea  of
negotiating  an  agreement  on  transparency  in  government  procurement,  as  on  other
Singapore issues. And we have seen that at the Fifth Ministerial Session at Cancun a
large number of members expressed unwillingness on going ahead with the negotiations
on  the  totality  of  Singapore  issues  and  for  that  reason  an  overall  accord  eluded  the
Session.
From the outset India and some other developing countries have been worried that
an agreement on transparency would be only the first step and would be followed by an
initiative on market access in government procurement. Their concern arose from the
threat that they perceived to the preferences for domestic suppliers prevalent in many
developing countries. Even though the Doha Ministerial Declaration seemed to settle the46
issue, doubts remained in this regard. These doubts were translated into a negative stance
of a number of members such as India, Malaysia and Egypt, which is reflected in the
minutes of successive meetings of the Working Group.
Written  submissions  made  in  the  Working  Group  are  available  in  the  WTO
documents in the WT/WGTGP/W series,  the minutes in the WT/WGTGP/M series and
the annual reports in the WT/WGTGP/ series. In the minutes frequent reference is made
to the Informal Note titled ‘List of the Issues Raised and Points Made’ drawn up by the
Chairman in the unrestricted document JOB (99)/6782 of 12 November 1999. But the
lack of availability of this document to the public is not a handicap, as the same list of
issues figures in the concise notes on the discussions provided by the Secretariat in the
unrestricted documents, WT/WGTGP/W/32 and 33.
We now analyse the key issues that have arisen in the Working Group on each of
the 12 items listed in the Chairman’s Informal Note. In this Section we lay out the issues
and in the next Section we consider the best option for India for the resolution of these
issues.
V.1  Definition and Scope of Government Procurement
There seems to be  a measure of agreement that the virtually identical definition
of government procurement contained in Article  III: 8(a) of GATT 1994  and  Article
XIII.1 of the GATS  could provide the basis for the definition for the purposes of a future
agreement in the area. However, agreement has not been reached on four main issues
with regard to coverage.
-  Whether it should be limited to outright acquisition for government use as in GPA
1981 or should be expanded to other types of contractual arrangements or transactions
such as lease, rental or hire purchase as in GPA 1996.
-  Whether both goods and services should be included.
-  Whether a certain threshold of value should apply as in the case of both GPA1981
and GPA 1996.47
-  Whether it should apply to entities at the central level only or extend also to sub-
central entities and whether government enterprises should also fall within its ambit.
On  the  first  of  these  issues  there  is  disagreement  in  particular  on  whether
concessions  and  build-operate-transfer  (BOT)  contracts  should  be  brought  within  the
purview of a future agreement. It might be mentioned here that these are not covered
clearly in the GPA 1996 though the subject is being discussed in the current Article
XXIV:7 negotiations, under which a definition has been proposed. The argument of the
opponents of an extended coverage is that concessions ‘generally have a different legal
basis,  purpose  and  philosophy  from  those  underlying  government  procurement’
(WT/WGTGP/W/32). On the coverage of services one of the  problems  raised  is  that
separate work has been undertaken on government procurement in the context of the
GATS.  On  the  question  of  threshold  some  members  believed  that  the  principle  of
transparency must apply only to purchases above a certain threshold value in order to
ensure that the obligations of an agreement are manageable particularly for developing
countries. Others felt that transparency was an aspect that must apply to all government
procurement equally, irrespective of value. However, as discussions progressed views
appeared  to  be  converging  toward  the  transparency  agreement  being  subject  to  a
threshold  value.  In  one  of  its  early  submissions  (WT/WGTGP/W/26)  the  EC  had
proposed certain values as maximum thresholds. In their joint proposal Hungary, Korea,
Singapore  and  the  United  States  also  envisaged  one  or  more  threshold/s  of  value
(WT/WGTGP/W/27). An EC paper submitted in June 2003 stated as follows:
‘The EC is in favour of minimising the impact of TGP rules on small entities in
DCs by making these rules only applicable above a given threshold, which could even be
higher for DCs. Good governance and efficient management in the public sector need a
selection  process  that  is  proportionate  to  the  value  of  the  goods  and  services  to  be
purchased’ (WT/WGTGP/W/41).
With regard to the coverage of sub-central entities, the main problems raised are
related  to  the  balance  of  rights  and  obligations  among  members  with  different48
constitutional  structures,  and  the  difficulty  that  could  be  experienced  by  the  central
government in ensuring compliance by sub-central entities. Some developing countries
are strongly in favour of only central/federal entities being covered. On state enterprises
one question that has been raised is with regard to the extent to which purchases made by
them could be regarded as purchases for ‘governmental purposes’ as envisaged in the
definition  of  government  procurement  in  both  GATT  1994  and  the  GATS.  Some
members have pointed out that governments do not have any control on the procurement
decisions of public enterprises. The EC would like all government procurement to be
covered, with option for limiting the application of some obligation. The US and others
(Hungary, Korea and Singapore) are willing to consider an option to cover only central
and federal government.
It would  be  relevant  to  mention  here  that  in  Annex  D  of  the  revised  Cancun
Ministerial  Text  [JOB  (03)/150/Rev.2)]  the  question  of  coverage  was  reflected  as
follows:
‘We further agree that any coverage of the of the agreement beyond goods and
central  government  entities  is  not  prejudged.  Only  procurement  above  certain  value
thresholds, to be negotiated, will be covered.’
V.2  Procurement methods
In the proposals made in the Working Group and in the discussions there appears
to be a meeting of minds that members must continue to have the ability to use any of the
usual types of procurement methods. These are open procedures,  where information on
the procurement opportunity and the selection criteria used is made available publicly,
selective tendering where such information is made available to pre-qualified suppliers,
and limited or single tendering. The emphasis is rather on ensuring that the choice of
procurement method is carried out on ‘a transparent, predictable and non-arbitrary basis’
(WT/WGTGP/M/14,  paragraph  41).  The  EC  paper  of  1999  on  the  elements  of  an
agreement  (WT/WGTGP/W/26,  Article  4:1)  proposed  that  the  procedures  must  be
notified in advance and must be transparent. The only real issue has been how to limit49
recourse  to  single  tendering  procedures.  The  US  paper  of  1998  (WT/WGTGP/W/16)
seems to suggest the inclusion in the agreement of an illustrative list of circumstances
(such as extreme urgency, absence of tenders, proprietary procurements etc.) under which
governments  may  have  recourse  to  this  method  plus  some  general  criteria  for
circumstances that are not provided in the list. Other suggestions include the requirement
to publish notices of invitation to tender and contract award notices and the requirement
for the procurement entities to maintain records in each case and to furnish in the contract
award notice the reasons for recourse to the method.
V.3  Publication of information on national legislation and procedures
There is a measure of agreement among members that publication of information
on  national  legislation  and  procedures  must  be    a  core  provision  of  a  transparency
agreement on government procurement. Differences remain on relatively minor issues
such as the types of information that must be made available and the manner in which
this should be done. The EC proposes that laws, regulations and administrative rulings of
general  application  relating  to  government  procurement  must  be  readily  and  easily
accessible to the public (WT/WGTGP/W/26, Article 3:1). During discussions it has been
proposed  that  policy  guidelines  and  judicial  decisions  must  also  be  available  in  this
manner. Some developing countries have expressed concern at the onerous nature of the
obligation to make available the entirety of these instruments in their legal form and
suggested  the  alternative  of  making  the  substance  of  all  government  instruments
available. The second issue is whether the information requires to be published or simply
made  readily  and  easily  accessible.  A  related  issue  is  the  establishment  of  a  central
enquiry point from which other members and their suppliers could obtain information on
national  legislation.  Some  members  with  a  federal  structure  of  government,  both
developing  and  developed,  feel  that  the  proposal  would  be  difficult  to  implement
(WT/WGTGP/M/14, paragraph 50).50
V.4  Information on procurement opportunities: tendering and qualification
requirements
This  is  another  area  in  which  the  views  of  members  are  not  wide  apart.  In
principle everyone agrees that ‘the information made available should be sufficient to
enable suppliers to assess their interest in a particular procurement and, should they wish
to  participate  in  it,  to  submit  responsive  bids’  (WT/WGTGP/W/32,  paragraph  41).
Opinions vary only on whether a minimum list of items must be stipulated on which it
must  be  obligatory  to  furnish  information  in  the  tender  notice  or  documentation,  or
whether there should be an illustrative  list.  The  EC  has  proposed  a  minimum  list  of
standard information to include (a) name of procuring entity, (b) the goods or services to
be procured, and their specifications, (c) the procurement procedure used, (d) any pre-
qualification  requirement,  (e)  any  restrictions  on  market  access  and/or  domestic
preferences granted, (f) the contact details for obtaining tender documentation, (g) the
award criteria), (h) the deadlines for the submission of tenders, and (i) the date and time
for the opening of tenders (WT/WGTGP/W/26,Article 5.2). Some members, including
India, feel that a list of minimum information would be unduly prescriptive and would
constrain flexibility in small value procurements, for instance. There is no proposal to
introduce  any  variation  in  the  normal  practice  of  advertising  the  tender  notices  in
government gazette, official journal or national or local newspapers. However, references
have  regularly  been  made  to  the  use  of  information  technology,  e.g.  the  Internet,  to
achieve transparency for advertisement of tender notices as well as for other purposes
(WT/WGTGP/W/33, paragraphs 75-76). One important suggestion is to adopt the GPA
1996 transparency provision requiring additionally the publication of summary tender
notices in a WTO language.
V.5  Time-periods
It is recognised  generally that an  agreement on transparency must contain  the
requirement that sufficient time period should be available to enable suppliers to obtain
the tender documentation and prepare and submit their bids in response. No suggestion
has  been  made  to  fix  minimum  deadlines  as  in  the  GPA  1996,  or  to  standardise  or51
harmonise the time limits. Rather, some guidelines are proposed, such as that the time
limits must take into account the particular circumstances of each procurement operation
including its complexity and that they should be the same for all suppliers.
V.6  Transparency of decisions on qualification
Three basic proposals, which are largely uncontested, have been made with regard
to decisions on qualification of suppliers. First, that the criteria for qualification must be
limited  to  necessary  requirements  only,  such  as  financial,  commercial  and  technical
capacities  of  suppliers  and  must  be  pre-disclosed  to  suppliers  in  advance.  Secondly,
where registration or pre-qualification systems are maintained these must be reopened at
periodic intervals to enable new suppliers to apply for them. Thirdly, information on the
basis of qualification decisions must be made available to all potential suppliers either
generally or on specific request. However, there is disagreement on the related proposal
that the procuring agencies must provide unsuccessful suppliers, upon request, with the
reasons for the denial of their request and that these suppliers should have the right to
challenge the conformity of the decision with the rules of the system. Doubts have been
expressed  on  the  feasibility  of  providing  information  to  unsuccessful  suppliers,
particularly  when  their  number  is  large,  and  on  overturning  decisions  on
qualification/registration. Some others, such as Brazil,  have expressed the view that the
provisions on qualification should be limited to setting out general principles and criteria
and should not be overly prescriptive (WT/WGTGP/M/15, paragraph 32).
V.7  Transparency of decisions on contract awards
For some members this would be one the most crucial elements of transparency.
Three elements have been proposed in this regard:
-  that the evaluation criteria, in objective terms, must be spelt out in advance in the
tender notice or tender documentation, and the award must be based strictly on these
criteria;52
-  that  the  tenders  must  be  received  and  opened  under  conditions  that  guarantee
regularity and impartiality and that rule out the possibility of manipulation; and
-  information on contract awards must be made publicly available, and unsuccessful
bidders must be notified or debriefed on the reasons for which their bids could not be
accepted.
Both  the  EC  and  the  US  have  stressed  that  ‘a  future  transparency  agreement
should have a provision requiring that unsuccessful bidders be informed of the rejection
of their bid, and, on request, be given information as to the reasons why their bid had
been rejected and the winning bid had been chosen’ (WT/WGTGP/M/15,paragraph 36).
Some  other  members  have  expressed  the  concern  that  such  a  requirement  would  be
onerous for the developing countries.
V.8  Domestic Review
The proposal that as a part of the transparency agreement WTO members must be
required to established  a process of domestic review of  contract award decisions  has
proved to be one of the more contentious ones in the Working Group. The opponents of
negotiations  in  this  area,  such  as  Egypt,  India  and  Malaysia  have  generally  used  the
argument  of  administrative  burden  on  developing  countries,  in  responding  to  the
proposals on various elements of transparency. In the case of domestic review, however,
their  objection  runs  deeper:  they  consider  that  there  is  no  place  for  provisions  on
domestic review in a transparency agreement. Malaysia has expressed particularly strong
views on this aspect:
‘Any eventual agreement on transparency in government procurement should be
limited in scope, should not be prescriptive, and should not have provisions on domestic
procurement  review  that  could  be  used  to  question  the  decisions  of  Members’
governments,  administrations  and  procurement  entities.  The  idea  of  domestic  review
procedures was fundamentally flawed in the context of a transparency agreement, the
provisions of which would basically allow the provision of information on what Members
did  and  how  they  did  it,  under  what  procedures,  what  time-periods,  and  what53
requirements  for  potential  bidders.  Without  a  reassurance  that  domestic  review
procedures would not question the decision of domestic authorities, his delegation could
not agree to including such procedures in a transparency agreement’ (WT/WGTGP/M/17,
paragraph 23)
Some  developing  countries  are  also  worried  that  the  introduction  of  review
procedures could result in the proliferation of challenges and lead to additional costs for
procurement agencies. On the other hand the proponents have stated that ‘the availability
of a bid challenge mechanism adds to the transparency of the decision-making process,
increases confidence in the effective functioning of the overall system and enables the
system to be seen to be transparent’ (WT/WGTGP/W/33, paragraph 54).
Both the EC (WT/WGTGP/W/26, Article 8) and the US, jointly with Hungary,
Korea  and  Singapore,  (WT/WGTGP/W/27,  Article  X:2)  have  proposed  that  WTO
members  must  be  required  to  establish  ‘fair  and  transparent  judicial,  arbitral  or
administrative’ bodies for the prompt review of practices and actions that are inconsistent
with  the  transparency  requirements.  These  proposals  also  set  out  two  important
requirements in this regard. The review body must be independent of the procurement
entities and all interested parties, who participated in the procurement process, or are
affected by the relevant practice or action, including foreign suppliers, must have access
to  it.  During  the  discussions  two  connected  matters  have  been  raised.  It  has  been
suggested that in order to enable the review procedures to work effectively there should
be a requirement for procurement entities to maintain full records of the procurement
process for a designated period. The question of remedies has also been raised. Should
the  review  body  have  the  authority  to  suspend  the  procurement  process  or  overturn
procurement decisions and/or grant compensation to parties that have suffered economic
loss as a result of procurement decisions that are held to be inconsistent with the rules?
Developing countries that oppose the establishment of domestic review procedures have
even greater reservation against such wide authority being given to the review body.54
In  the  revised  draft  Cancun  Ministerial  Text,  the  following  language  was
proposed on domestic review:
‘In  regard  to  domestic  review  mechanisms,  the  agreement  will  address  the
transparency of such mechanisms, but not otherwise prescribe their characteristics.’
V.9  Other matters related to transparency
There is wide recognition of the need for  an explicit requirement for procuring
entities to maintain records of the key stages of individual procurement operations  Some
developing country members are of the opinion that matters like the period and the means
of maintaining the records must appropriately be decided by domestic legislation, while
other members, such as the US and Japan, have suggested that the details be left to the
negotiations.
It is widely recognised that the use of information technology and of languages
other than the national language would considerably enhance transparency in government
procurement. But no one has envisaged anything more than a best-endeavours rule in
these  areas.  The  EC  has  proposed  that  ‘Members  are  encouraged  to  ensure  that  all
information  referred  to  in  this  Agreement  is  provided  in  a  WTO  language’
(WT/WGTGP/W/26, Article 10). Brazil, the US and China have said that the national
language should prevail in procurement-related matters while Japan, Korea, Morocco and
the EC have suggested that for certain matters, e.g. lists of national laws and regulations
and documents related to consultations and dispute settlement a WTO language could be
used (WT/WGTGP/M/15, paragraphs 57-60). Likewise Hungary, Korea, Singapore and
the United States have proposed that ‘Members and procuring entities are encouraged to
use, to the extent possible, electronic communications at all stages of the procurement
process,  provided  it  complies  with  the  requirements  of  this  Agreement’
(WT/WGTGP/W/27, Article IX:2).
There  has  been  discussion  on  the  relationship  between  transparency  in
government  procurement  and  the  fight  against  bribery  and  corruption.  It  is  not  that55
members have proposed a provision in this regard in a future agreement but that they
have  drawn  attention  to  this  aspect  as  the  rationale  for  a  transparency  agreement  in
government procurement. Other members have felt that matters of bribery and corruption
must be discussed in other fora and not brought up in the WTO.
V.10  Information to be provided to other governments (Notification)
The  centrality  of  the  obligation  to  notify  all  laws  and  regulations  relating  to
government procurement is widely recognised. The following provision proposed by the
EC would also seem to command support of members:
‘Laws  and  regulations  shall  be  promptly  notified  to  the  WTO  Secretariat.
Members  shall  further  provide  a  list  in  one  of  the  WTO  languages  of  the  relevant
generally applicable instruments. The WTO Secretariat shall endeavour to make such
lists available to the general public through an electronic medium’ (WT/WGTGP/W/26,
Article 11).
There is less support, however, for the proposal that each member must establish
central enquiry points that are capable of serving as a single access point for information
on  the  laws  and  regulations.  Some  members  feel  that  co-ordination  among  different
government  departments  and  central  and  sub-central  levels  may  be  difficult  to
accomplish.  There  is  also  wide  opposition  to  the  idea  of  statistical  reporting  of
procurement activity on the grounds that it would be burdensome and would go beyond
the requirement of transparency.
V.11  WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures
This  aspect  has  emerged  as  the  single  most  controversial  issue  in  the  area  of
transparency in government procurement. The EC has proposed that the provisions of
Articles  XXII  and  XXIII  of  GATT  1994  or  Articles  XXII  and  XXIII  of  GATS
respectively, as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding, would
apply to disputes among members on the decisions of the authority in charge of domestic56
review on any procurement above the threshold value (WT/WGTGP/W/26, Article 13).
The proposal of Hungary, Korea, Singapore and the United States (WT/WGTGP/W/27,
Article XII) also contains a provision for the WTO dispute settlement procedures to be
invoked  by    members  only  after  interested  parties  have  been  encouraged  to  use  the
domestic review procedures.  The latter proposal also stipulates that recommendations of
the Dispute Settlement Body on measures found to be inconsistent with the provisions on
transparency  would  not  affect  prior  contract  awards.  In  a  later  submission
(WT/WGTGP/W/38) the US has proposed the agreement would specify that the use of
domestic  review  procedures  ‘would  be  the  only  method  through  which  a  specific
procurement could be challenged’ and that ‘the DSU would not be available to challenge
a specific procurement, and thus could not be used to overturn a contract award.'
A number of members have opposed the applicability of WTO dispute settlement
procedures to a possible future agreement on transparency in government procurement.
The arguments given by Brazil in opposing the extension of the DSU to the area also
seem to reflect the views of some other developing  country members (China,  Egypt,
India, Malaysia and Pakistan):
‘The WTO dispute settlement mechanism was based on the presumption that a
violation of an obligation would have an effect on the trade of Members, whereas in the
context of an agreement on transparency in government procurement, there could be no
such  presumption.  Further,  under  the  DSU,  the  way  to  correct  non-compliance  was
through compensation or retaliation. It would be difficult to base any dispute settlement
system on that premise because there would be no violation of trade rights in the case of a
transparency agreement’ (WT/WGTGP/M/17, paragraph 16).
Malaysia  has  proposed  that  the  ‘future  provisions  could  be  in  the  form  of  a
declaration, an understanding among Members or an agreement with no linkage to the
DSU’  (WT/WGTGP/M/15,  paragraph  83).  Other  suggestions  include  the  soft  law
approach of setting up a peer-review mechanism rather than an enforceable agreement.57
The EC has recognised that ‘the absence of market access obligation made it more
difficult to conceive application of dispute settlement’(WT/WGTGP/M/15, paragraph 73)
but  still  feels  that  the  application  of  the  DSU  was  necessary  in  order  to  establish
confidence in the agreement and ensure that it is adhered to. Without enforcement the
agreement was not likely to be taken seriously by members. The US has conceded that
the chances of disputes being raised on the issue of transparency were low. But it has
argued that it was necessary for the DSU to be available ‘ for systemic failures to comply
with, or a high level of disregard to, the agreement, for instance if there were refusals to
ever publish a notice, or refusals to ever make information available about procurement
methods’ (WT/WGTGP/M/17paragraph 66). The US proposal referred to above, that the
individual procurement decisions would remain be subject only to domestic review and
not  to  disputes  under  the  DSU,  has  served  to  assuage  some  of  the  concerns  of  the
developing countries.
In the revised draft Ministerial text, the following language was proposed on the
issue of dispute settlement:
‘The issue of the applicability of the DSU is not prejudged, with the exception
that individual contract awards shall not  be  subject  to  challenge  or  recommendations
under the WTO dispute settlement system.’
V.12  Technical co-operation and special and differential treatment of developing
countries
Technical assistance is one of the least controversial areas in the discussions on
transparency  in  government  procurement.  The  texts  proposed  both  by  the  EC  and
Hungary,  Korea,  Singapore  and  the  US  propose  that  technical  assistance  would  be
provided to developing and least developed country members on request and on mutually
agreed  terms  and  conditions.  These  texts  do  not  make  any  proposals  on  special  and
differential  (S&D)  treatment,  but  the  subject  has  figured  in  the  discussions  in  the
Working Group. Members have made proposals that S&D treatment could be given to
developing and least developed members by providing them with transitional periods,58
applying a higher level of threshold values, or exempting them from coverage in relation
to entities at sub-central levels or services (WT/WGTGP/W/33, paragraphs 117). Others
have expressed the view that the aspect could more appropriately addressed once the
substantive elements of the agreement had been finalised.
VI  Approaching negotiations on Transparency in Government Procurement
In the light of the foregoing analysis  how should India  approach the subject in
the future negotiations in the Doha Round. We have pointed out above that at Doha it
appeared  that  WTO  members  had  already  recognised  the  need  for  a  multilateral
framework  in  the  area  and  agreed  that  negotiations  would  take  place  after  the  Fifth
Session for realising such a framework. The only additional step that needed to be taken
was to agree (by explicit consensus) on the modalities for such negotiations. However,
the need to take a decision on the modalities by consensus opened the door to a de novo
consideration of the basic issue whether transparency in government procurement (as also
other Singapore subjects) needed to be on the agenda of the round at all. There is more
than a modicum of legal basis in the argument that the Singapore subjects are already a
part of the ‘single undertaking’ envisaged in the agenda of the negotiations set out in the
Doha Ministerial Declaration adopted in September 2001. But the Ministerial Declaration
cannot be the subject of a dispute under the DSU, and in interpreting it WTO members
have to rely on the continuation of political consensus in its support. Any reinterpretation
by a small minority of members can be dealt with by diplomatic persuasion and pressure
but  the  disagreement  by  a  large  group  of  the  membership  to  go  ahead  with  the
negotiations on any subject really implies that the issue is open once more.
At the resumption of the negotiations, therefore, India can start discussions on the
basis that the proponents have to make out a case once again why it is necessary to have
an  agreement  in  the  area  of  transparency  in  government  procurement.  And  there  are
serious problems here with the position taken by the proponents of negotiations. In the
area  of  government  procurement  many  developing  countries  perceive  a  threat  to
preferences to domestic suppliers that they regard as an essential development tool. In
order to allay their fears the proponents of a transparency agreement agreed to exclude59
market  access  altogether  from  the  purview  of  a  possible  future  agreement.  In  the
successive  plurilateral  agreements  on  government  procurement  (GPA  1981  and  GPA
1996) one of the main objectives was to eliminate the exception in respect of government
procurement  from  the  national  treatment  obligation  and  to  ensure  that  foreign  and
domestic  suppliers  were  treated  on  an  equal  footing.  It  is  not  so  in  the  proposed
agreement on transparency. The agreement on excluding market access from the scope
of a transparency agreement on government procurement might have served the purpose
of  meeting  a  major  concern  of  some  developing  countries,  but  it  also  knocked  out
substantially its relationship with trade. According to GATT 1994 as interpreted over the
years  and  even  more  explicitly  the  GATS  the  MFN  obligation  does  not  extend  to
government  procurement.  Both  these  agreements  specifically  exclude  government
procurement also from the purview of the national treatment obligation. A transparency
agreement on government procurement would not affect the right of a WTO member to
restrict  the  procurement  opportunity  to  domestic  suppliers  and  exclude  altogether
suppliers from other members. Even more egregious will be the possibility for WTO
members to allow the suppliers of some other members selectively and deny the right to
the  suppliers  of  others.  In  light  of  this  analysis  it  is  questionable  if  a  transparency
agreement  on  government  procurement  without  market  access  has  a  bearing  on  the
multilateral trade relations of members and is appropriate for negotiating a multilateral
agreement under Article III of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation.
It is connected more with the socio-economic objective of improving governance and
checking bribery and corruption particularly in the developing countries and less with the
expansion  of  trade  in  goods  and  services.  Some  Members  have  acknowledged  that
suppression  of  corruption  would  be  an  incidental  benefit  but  have  been  reluctant  to
pursue the negotiations from that standpoint because of difficulty in relating it to the
WTO. Greater transparency in government procurement would also bring efficiency and
value  for  money  benefits  and  contribute  to  improvement  in  the  management  of  the
domestic economy. But again, it has been contested if this is a proper function of the
WTO(Arrowsmith 2003).60
The  above  having  been  said,  it  must  also  be  acknowledged  it  has  been
demonstrated that corruption and bribery is a deep-seated canker, which is eating into the
vitals  of  the  Indian  polity  and  seriously  undermining  the  development  efforts  in  the
country. Quite independently of the WTO negotiations in the area both the State and
Central governments should have an interest in improving transparency in government
procurement at all levels. Indeed it is imperative that they do so in order to stem the rot
that has been exposed in successive sting operations. If the target of eight per cent GDP
growth is to be achieved massive leakage of government funds must be plugged. What
better opportunity could be there than this in which we do what is in our national interest
any way and claim credit for it in the multilateral trade negotiations.
Will  India  have  to  undertake  a  wholesale  change  in  its  procurement  laws,
regulations and practices, if it were to agree to the elements that have been proposed in
the Working Group for an agreement in the area. Our examination has shown that in the
Central  Government  as  well  as  in  the  relatively  advanced  states  of  Karnataka  and
Tamilnadu,  the  procurement  procedures  conform  broadly  to  the  requirements  of
transparency envisaged in GPA 1996. The proposals on transparency in the Working
Group  are  more  general  and  less  prescriptive  than  those  in  GPA  1996,  and  should
therefore be less of a problem. The most important additional measure that would need to
be taken in the Central government is to establish an independent challenge mechanism.
Karnataka  and  Tamilnadu  have  provided  for  such  a  mechanism  in  their  recently
promulgated  laws,  but  it  is  not  independent,  as  required  in  GPA  1996  and  in  the
proposals that have been made in the Working Group. The two major deficiencies found
by the World Bank in its survey of government procurement in the Central Government
and in the public enterprises of the Central Government are that the evaluation criteria are
not drawn up  clearly  and  there  is  no  debriefing  of  unsuccessful  tenderers.  These  are
matters on which a transparency agreement would certainly contain specific provisions.
The World Bank has noted also that negotiations are held in a routine fashion with the
lowest tenderer, and orders are split up among more than one supplier. On these matters,
no precise provision has been proposed in the Working Group but such practices would
seem to be ruled out by the general requirement that decisions on award of contract must61
be taken only on the basis of the terms set out in the notice inviting tender and tender
documentation. Common sense dictates that the Government must bring about reforms to
overcome  these  deficiencies,  whether  or  not  a  transparency  agreement  materialises
ultimately. And undertaking obligations to ensure that these shortcomings in the rules and
practice are eliminated should not be considered onerous at all.
What is the implication of all this for India’s overall approach to the negotiations
in the area? Should it or should it not agree to negotiations in the area? The answer is that
India should set a price for agreeing to negotiate in this area. The price can be in the
modalities of negotiations in the areas of agriculture and non-agricultural market access,
or  in  the  substantive  negotiations  on  market  access  in  services.  Further,  the  level  of
ambition of the transparency agreement can be calibrated in accordance with what India
can secure in those negotiations. More on this later when we consider the position that
India should take on some of the important elements of the proposed agreement.
Seeking  a  quid  pro  quo  in  other  areas  of  negotiations  is  not  the  only  option.
Parties to the GPA 1996 could give other reciprocal benefits to India and other non-
Parties to that plurilateral agreement. We have seen above that the GPA 1996 envisages
that if non-Parties comply with key transparency provisions of that agreement, they can
be given conditional access to  competitive  tendering  procedures  as  well  as  challenge
procedures. As a price for agreeing to the transparency agreement, India could ask for
being given access to these procedures in respect of at least some of the entities or class
of goods and services of its interest in the major industrialised countries. Of course it
would not be legitimate for it to ask for the full benefits of the plurilateral agreement,
until and unless it is agreeable to guarantee national treatment to foreign suppliers. The
way the Indian economic policy is evolving, the day might come soon when it would be
willing to commit itself to giving up all preferences to domestic suppliers, which is nearly
the position on the ground already. In that eventuality, an agreement on transparency in
government procurement will not be sufficient to respond to India’s economic interest.
India must then seek to become a Party to the GPA 1996.62
Once  India  has  decided  to  seriously  engage  in  the  negotiations,  its  positions
would have to be developed on the proposed elements. In the discussions, in respect of
many  of  the  elements  India  has  expressed  the  general  difficulty  that  the  requirement
would be administratively burdensome. For the most part this objection emanates from
the generally negative approach to envisaging an agreement in the area. Some of the
more onerous proposals such as statistical reporting seem to have been talked out already
in the past discussions  and  are  unlikely  to  be  pressed.  We  consider  below  three  key
aspects, on which the greatest amount of debate has taken place in the Working Group
viz. scope of government procurement, domestic review and WTO dispute settlement
procedures.
VI.1  Scope of government procurement
On the scope the really important issues are those relating to the threshold and the
entities to be covered. There is some merit in the argument that the concept of threshold
is  more  relevant  to  market  access  and  less  to  an  agreement  encompassing  only
transparency  aspects.  The  same  transparency  rules  must  necessarily  apply  to  all
government procurement, irrespective of the value of an individual transaction. As far as
really small purchases are concerned they are in any case exempted from the normal
procedures and are directly bought from the market. However, a threshold value will
serve to increase the comfort level of WTO members with a transparency agreement.
Moreover, if a domestic review mechanism is to be set up, and it is difficult to envisage
an agreement without such a mechanism, a value threshold will provide one of the ways
to keep the number of challenges to procurement decisions under control. India must
press for a suitably high threshold value being fixed for the transparency agreement.
The issue of entities is more complex. First of all there can be no escape from all
central government agencies being brought under the purview of a future agreement. But
should India agree to state governments and government enterprises being covered. In the
case of government enterprise, the answer is easy. We have seen that the development
strategy adopted by India after independence involved the state in several industrial and
commercial enterprises. Although after the economic reforms of 1991-92 the government63
has embarked on a divestment programme, for a long time to come it may remain saddled
with  a  large  number  of  such  enterprises.  There  is  a      problem  with  bringing  central
government enterprises within the purview of the agreement. Much of the procurement
done by the industrial enterprises is meant to be used in the production of goods for
commercial sale and is therefore not covered at all by the basic definition of government
procurement in GATT 1994 or the GATS. In fact it is possible to argue that all the goods
(and services) procured by these enterprises are meant to be used in the production of
goods for commercial sale. Take, for instance, the case of the Steel Authority of India
(SAIL) purchasing spare parts for the rolling mills, or air conditioners for its managerial
staff. Clearly both the spare parts and air conditioners are used in the production of goods
for  commercial  sale.  Nevetheless,  unless  there  is  an  explicit  exclusion,  given  the
government control and influence on these enterprises, an argument could be made on the
basis of Article XXIV: 6b of the GPA 1996 that all procurement transactions of these
enterprises are covered by the disciplines of the transparency agreement. Transparency
disciplines might not be fully suited for commercial and industrial enterprises. India must
therefore  argue  for  the  exclusion  of  government  enterprises  from  the  purview  of  the
transparency agreement.
We have seen that the central government has the constitutional powers to enact
laws on government procurement that could apply to all state governments. It is possible
to foresee that the Government of India would act to improve governance in the states
and impose the Tamilnadu or Karnataka type of transparency laws on other states. But
such a major decision cannot be taken easily. To justify taking such action to comply
with an agreement in the WTO India must get some major benefits in the current round of
multilateral trade negotiations. If there is a major advance made by the industrialised
country trading partners of India on reducing/eliminating agricultural subsidies, or by
making concessions in the movement of natural persons (in the GATS negotiations), or in
eliminating import duty on textiles and clothing, then India could consider undertaking
the transparency obligation in respect of state government entities, as part of the bargain.
In the eventuality of minimal advances in these areas, India must argue for limiting the
coverage to the level of central government alone. This is the calibration to which we64
have referred earlier. Instead of arguing for excluding some types of transactions such as
hire purchase or leaving out an entire sector such as services, the best means for limiting
the coverage is by restricting its scope to central government entities.
VI.2  Domestic Review
India, Malaysia and some other countries have argued against any provision being
made  requiring  that  provision  be  made  for  domestic  review  by  establishing  an
independent challenge mechanism. If the WTO members are to accept provisions for
ensuring  transparency  of  the  laws,  regulations  and  guidelines  of  general  application
relating to government procurement in general and also of individual opportunities for
procurement, then surely they must also agree on a mechanism for enforcement of the
provisions. There are some valid points being made by India, Malaysia and others on
extending  the  WTO  DSU  to  a  transparency  agreement  but  the  argument  against  an
effective domestic review mechanism is weak. As in other areas covered by the WTO
Agreement, the establishment of domestic review mechanism must be the primary means
of enforcement, and the means must be efficient and effective. And for efficiency and
effectiveness it is important that the mechanism is independent. In India some amount of
surveillance is maintained by the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Vigilance
Commissioner, but this surveillance is of a post facto nature and can result only in action
against the officials concerned. An effective domestic review mechanism must, however,
be able to provide relief to the aggrieved supplier, suspend the procurement, or overturn
the  procurement  decision.  For  all  this  it  is  important  that  it  is  independent  of  the
procurement entity. One fear expressed is that the challenge mechanism may become a
tool for delaying procurement operations. Some amount of delay has to be tolerated in the
interest of fair play and checking leakage of government funds. Since a threshold of value
is likely to be agreed, the challenge mechanism would be available only for higher value
contracts, where the stakes are large. Further to ensure that vexatious proceedings are not
launched a requirement must be introduced that in order to take recourse to the challenge
mechanism  a  security  deposit  would  have  to  be  made,  which  should  be  liable  to  be
forfeited  if  the  application  is  found  to  be  without  substance.  If  India  agrees  to  a65
transparency agreement in government procurement, it must also agree to an independent
challenge mechanism to be a part of it.
VI.3  WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures
The argument against the proposal for the DSU being applied to a transparency
agreement has some validity inasmuch as the market access element is excluded from its
purview.  The  soft  law  approach  is  definitely  an  option  and  one  could  envisage  two
variants  of  this  approach.  The  subject  could  either  be  covered  in  the  Trade  Policy
Reviews periodically as a part of the larger exercise, or  a special committee could be
created in the WTO in which all aspects of government procurement activities could be
subject to peer review, taking up each member at a time. But it cannot be stated that
exclusion  of  market  access  would  make  a  transparency  agreement  altogether
incompatible with the DSU. Once in the agreement WTO members make a commitment
to make their government procurement related rules accessible to other members  and
suppliers in other members and agree to publish individual procurement opportunities in
a manner that allows wide participation, a complaint can certainly be made against them
for nullification and impairment of the benefits under the agreement for failure to comply
with its provisions. A complaint can also be made for failure to establish an independent
domestic review mechanism, and a finding of non-compliance would certainly result in a
recommendation to bring their laws and practice in conformity with the agreement. There
would be difficulty only in determining the quantum of retaliatory action, if such an
eventuality arises. But where there has been a failure to comply with an obligation, the
quantum of retaliatory action has not always been determined by the trade effect. Once it
is agreed that the DSU would apply to the transparency agreement there would be scope
for  fine-tuning  of  the  dispute  settlement  aspect.  It  is  apparent  that  the  non-violation
nullification or impairment of the benefits of the agreement would not apply for instance.
The  concern  that  disputes  in  the  WTO  would  result  in  disruption  in  the
procurement  processes  in  member  countries  has  been  met  to  a  large  extent  by  the
proposal  of  the  US  that  individual  procurement  decisions  would  be  subject  only  to
domestic  review  and  not  to  disputes  under  the  DSU.  There  is  a  large  measure  of66
agreement also that disputes could be raised in the WTO only after the domestic review
process has been exhausted.
In the light of the above analysis India could agree to the transparency agreement
being subject to disputes under the DSU. However, once again a calibrated approach
would be warranted. A transparency agreement on the basis of a peer review approach
can make a great deal of sense, but if something stronger is required by the proponents
then there should be some additional commitments by way of quid pro quo in other areas
of negotiations.
VII  Summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations
½  Governments  in  developed  and  developing  countries  have  used  government
procurement as a tool for promoting domestic industry and aiding particular types of
enterprises.  In  order  to  ensure  that  the  use  of  this  instrument  is  not  hindered  the
contracting  parties  to  GATT  1947  excluded  government  procurement  from  the
national treatment obligation of that agreement. Although the de jure situation in this
regard is less clear, in the conduct of their trade relations the contracting parties to
GATT 1947 and later the WTO members have treated government procurement as
being not covered by the MFN obligation of GATT 1947 as well as GATT 1994. In
the GATS government procurement was specifically excluded from the purview of
obligations relating to MFN and national treatment as well as market access. Due to
the exclusion of both goods and services from the key obligations of GATT 1994 and
GATS it has been possible for a subset of contracting parties of GATT 1947 and of
WTO members to restrict the benefits of the plurilateral agreement on government
procurement to the parties to the agreement.
½  In the Tokyo Round Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA 1981) the Parties
(mainly  a  number  of  OECD  countries  and  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore)  agreed  to
extend  MFN  and  national  treatment  to  each  other  in  government  procurement
essentially in the area of goods. But the coverage of the agreement was restricted to67
the entities (Ministries and other government agencies) listed by each party in  an
annex  to  the  agreement,  and  was  subject  to  a  threshold  of  value  for  individual
purchases.  Besides  the  substantive  obligations  of  non-discrimination  there  were
obligations relating to transparency and tendering procedures. The GPA 1981 was
revised in 1988 with some improvement in the text and lowering of the threshold of
value.
½  Thereafter  another  negotiation  ensued  in  parallel  with  the  Uruguay  Round  but
unconnected  with  it.  These  negotiations  resulted  in  the  WTO  Agreement  on
Government Procurement 1996 (GPA 1996) with vastly increased coverage of the
agreement including entities at sub-Federal level and service contracts, particularly
construction, and government enterprises as well. The text of the Agreement was also
overhauled. Parties have generally excluded procurement from small enterprises. A
feature of the Agreement was that a number of Parties took recourse to sectoral non-
application against other Parties where they felt that they had not received reciprocal
benefits in the listing of entities. This feature makes the substantive obligation of
unconditional MFN treatment of GPA 1996 somewhat unique: it applies where the
derogation has not been specifically stipulated. In GATT 1994 derogations are barred
altogether. In the GATS derogations are possible only if MFN exemption has been
scheduled. In GPA 1996 the provisions on transparency and tendering procedures
were  elaborated  further  and  an  important  innovation  was  the  introduction  of
procedures enabling suppliers to challenge alleged breaches of the Agreement.
½  The  government  procurement  practices  in  India  have  been  recently  surveyed  and
critically examined by the World Bank. The World Bank report brings out that as far
as transparency is concerned on many aspects the prescribed procedures in the central
government are broadly in line with the requirements of GPA 1996. This is the case
in respect of procedures relating to invitation to participate in intended procurement,
selection procedures, time limits for tendering and delivery, submission, receipt and
opening of tenders. With respect to these phases, the criticism is of deviations from
the  rules  in  practice  rather  than  of  absence  of  rules.  Some  of  these  practices  are68
selective/restrictive advertisement, selective sale of tender documents, substitution of
documents,  permitting  and  soliciting  modification  of  bid  after  public  opening,
deliberate  delay  in  processing  of  tenders,  selective  leaking  of  information,  and
splitting awards without good reasons. There are, however, some more significant
shortcomings in the Indian practice and rules in some other aspects of the procedures.
Tender  documentation  does  not  always  clearly  specify  the  criteria  of  awarding
contract. Negotiations are held in a routine manner with the lowest bidder. There is no
requirement of debriefing of the unsuccessful bidder or for the publication of contract
awards. Above all, formal appeal or challenge procedures are absent. The practices in
the central government enterprises reflect broadly the practices and the shortcomings
of the procedures in the central government. In the states there is wide variation in the
standard of government procurement procedures. Some of the more advanced states
(Karnataka and Tamilnadu) have introduced legislation on transparency, which puts
them ahead of the central government. Others like Uttar Pradesh have procurement
practices that reflect their generally lower quality of governance.
½  On the more substantive aspects of non-discrimination in government procurement
there is no departure in India from the MFN principle. On national treatment things
have changed considerably following the introduction of economic reforms in 1991-
92. Explicit price preferences stipulated earlier in favour of public sector suppliers
has been given up. Purchase preference for other domestic suppliers has been phased
out, and while it is being temporarily extended to public sector enterprises, it is the
declared intention of government to eliminate this also. All that remains now is the
preference for small-scale and cottage industries, but it is arguable that this preference
is on par with the exemption that some major GPA 1996 signatories have obtained in
respect of small enterprises.
½  In the Working Group on transparency in government procurement the objective of
the proponents is to obtain agreement on a level of transparency that is somewhat
lower than what is envisaged in the GPA 1996. The proposed elements include: scope
of the agreement; publication of information on national legislation and procurement69
opportunities; time periods; transparency of decisions on qualification and on contract
awards; domestic review; and WTO dispute settlement procedures. If the proposed
elements were accepted in most respects not much change would be required in the
Government  of  India  practices.  The  only  areas  where  an  agreement  would  entail
changes are with respect to the practice of not publishing the award criteria clearly,
holding routine negotiations with the lowest bidder, and not debriefing unsuccessful
suppliers. But making these changes would really be tantamount to bringing about
much needed reform to this area of government activity. The principal issues that
have emerged in the debate in the Working Group and on which India and other
developing countries have expressed concern are scope of the agreement, domestic
review, and WTO dispute settlement procedures.
½  At Doha it appeared that the WTO members had already recognised the need for a
multilateral agreement in the area and agreed that negotiations would take place after
the Fifth Session for realising such a framework. The only additional step that was
needed was to agree on the modalities for such negotiations. However, the need to
take  a  decision  on  the  modalities  by  consensus  opened  the  door  to  a  de  novo
consideration of the basic issue whether transparency in government procurement (as
also other Singapore issues) needed to be on the agenda of the round at all. At the
resumption of negotiations, therefore, India can start discussions on the basis that the
proponents  have  to  make  out  a  case  afresh  why  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  WTO
agreement in the area. The specific points that remain outstanding could be addressed
only after this preliminary point has been settled.
½  There are serious problems on the relationship with trade of a purely transparency
agreement  on  government  procurement.  In  order  to  meet  a  major  concern  of  the
developing  countries  the  proponents  agreed  to  exclude  market  access  from  the
purview  of  negotiations.  But  in  doing  so  they  also  knocked  out  substantially  its
relationship with trade. A transparency agreement would not restrict the right of a
member under GATT 1994 and the GATS to restrict the opportunity to domestic
suppliers and exclude altogether suppliers from other members of the WTO. Even70
more egregious would be the possibility for WTO members to allow the suppliers
from some members and deny the right to the suppliers from others. In the light of
this  analysis  a  transparency  agreement  on  government  procurement  sans  market
access would be connected more with the socio-economic objective of  improving
governance and less with the expansion of trade in goods and services. Transparency
in government procurement could bring efficiency and value for money benefits, but
these aspects have little to do with the WTO Agreement.
½  It is not suggested that for the above reason India must oppose negotiations in the
area. Since the agreement would serve to remove a major malaise in governance India
might as well agree to the negotiations. But it should ask by way of quid pro quo for
appropriate  concessions  in  other  major  areas  of  negotiations  in  the  Doha  Round.
Concessions can also be sought with respect to government procurement covered by
GPA  1996.  That  agreement  envisages  that  if  non-Parties  comply  with  key
transparency  provisions  of  that  agreement,  they  can  get  conditional  access  to
competitive  tendering  procedures  as  well  as  challenge  procedures.  As  a  price  for
agreeing to the transparency agreement  India could  ask for being  given access to
these procedures in respect of  at least some of the entities or class of  goods  and
services of its interest in the major industrialised countries.
½  If India decides to seriously engage in the negotiations, it would have to develop a
position on the proposed elements. For most of the elements India’s has stated that
the main difficulty is the administrative burden that is entailed. For the most part this
objection emanates from the generally negative approach to envisaging an agreement
in the area. Some of the more onerous proposals such as statistical reporting seem to
have been talked out. There are three main areas where a decision has to be taken viz.
scope  of  government  procurement,  domestic  review  and  WTO  dispute  settlement
procedures.
½  On scope the really important issues are those relating to the threshold and entities to
be covered. There is some merit in the argument that the concept of threshold is more71
relevant to market access and less to an agreement encompassing only transparency
aspects. However, it would be expedient to have a value threshold in order to increase
generally the  comfort level of  governments with such  an agreement. Moreover,  a
value threshold would serve to keep the number of challenges in the domestic review
mechanism under control. As for the entities, government enterprises must be kept
out for two reasons. First, because in most cases they are commercial and industrial
enterprises, and even in the GPA 1996 the Parties have excluded such enterprises.
Second, because much of the procurement done by these enterprises is used in the
production of goods or services for commercial sale, and such goods do not come
under the definition of government procurement in GATT 1994 or the GATS. As for
state governments,  the  central  government  does  have  the  constitutional  powers  to
impose  reformed  government  procurement  procedures  on  them.  But  such  a  step
would be a huge undertaking and should not be taken lightly. On the other hand if
India’s trading partners are willing to give valuable reciprocal concessions in other
areas of negotiations India could consider bringing state government departments and
agencies also under the purview of the transparency agreement.
½  There is a strong case for agreeing to an effective challenge mechanism for domestic
review  as  without  it  the  transparency  agreement  would  remain  toothless.  The
mechanism would be effective only if it is independent and has the ability to provide
relief  to  the  aggrieved  supplier,  suspend  the  procurement,  or  overturn  it.  The
threshold of value in the agreement would ensure that the mechanism is available
only for high value contracts where the stakes are high. A system of security deposit
could be introduced to safeguard against vexatious cases.
½  The argument against making the DSU applicable has some validity inasmuch as the
market access element is excluded from the purview of the transparency agreement.
The soft law approach is definitely an option and one could envisage either bringing it
within the purview of the Trade Policy Review or setting up peer review procedures
independently for government procurement. But it cannot be stated that exclusion of
market access would make a transparency agreement incompatible with the DSU. The72
provisions  of  the  DSU  could  be  fine-tuned  to  the  requirements  of  a  transparency
agreement. The concern that disputes in the WTO would result in disruption in the
procurement processes in member countries has been met to a large extent by the US
proposal that individual procurement decisions would be subject to domestic review
and not to disputes under the DSU. India could therefore agree to the transparency
agreement being subject to disputes under the DSU. However, once again a calibrated
approach  would  be  warranted.  A  transparency  agreement  on  the  basis  of  a  peer
review can serve the purpose, but if something stronger is required then additional
concessions must be given by the proponents in other areas of negotiations.73
References
Arrowsmith, S “Transparency in Government Procurement: The Objectives of Regulation
and the Boundaries of the World Trade Organization. In Journal of World
Trade 37(2), 2003.
 Blank, A. and G. Marceau  “The History of Government Procurement Negotiations
Since 1945”. Public Procurement Law Review, 4 (1996):77-147.
Debroy, B and G. Pursell. “Government Procurement Policies in India”. In  Law and
Policy in Public Purchasing, edited by B. M. Hoekman and P.C.
Mavroidis. University of Michigan, 1997.
Hoekman, B. “The Government Procurement Agreement: Introduction and Overview”. In
Law and Policy in Public Purchasing, edited by B. M. Hoekman and P.C.
Mavroidis. University of Michigan, 1997.
Low, P. A., A. Mattoo and Subramanian A. “Government Procurement in Services”. In
Law and Policy in Public Purchasing, edited by B. M. Hoekman and P.C.
Mavroidis. University of Michigan, 1997.
Muthuswamy and Brinda.  Swamy’s Compilation of General Financial Rules. New
Delhi: Swamy Publishers, 2002.
The World Bank (2001), Country Procurement Assessment Report (India)